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NOTES AND COMMENTS
UNION AUTHORIZATION CARDS
The method of selecting a bargaining representative under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act is of central importance in the scheme of
federal labor law.1 The Act attaches great significance to the choice
of the majority of employees. The union elected by a majority acts as
the "exclusive representative" of all employees,2 and the employer
must bargain with that union about all terms and conditions of em-
ployment.3 Because of the significance of this choice, section 9(c) of
the Act provides that election shall be by secret ballot on the petition
of any interested party: employee, union, or management.4 In conduct-
ing these elections, the NLRB takes great care to prevent management
and unions from coercing the voting employees." Nevertheless, the
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947). 29 U.S.C.
§ 141 (1964).
2. See Cox g- Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 63 HAxv. L. REv. 389, 396 (1950). Houde Engineering Co., 1 N.L.B. 87
(Mar. 3, 1934) established the exclusive representative concept, enacted by section 9(a)
of the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
3. Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment. ...
61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
4. Wherever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations
as may be prescribed by the Board-
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization
acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be
represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize
their representative as the representative defined in section 9(a), or (Hi) assert that
the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently
recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a repre-
sentative as defined in section 9(a); or
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations
have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in
section 9(a)...
If the Board finds... that . . . a question of representation exists, it shall direct
an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
61 Star. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
5. See discussion accompanying notes 120-22 infra. The Board has characterized its
efforts in regulating elections as the promotion of "laboratory" conditions, in order "to
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees." General Shoe Corp., 77 N.LR.B.
124, 127 (1948).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Board, under certain circumstances, has allowed unions to circumvent
regulated secret ballot elections by permitting them to attain exclusive
representation status" on the basis of authorization cards secured from
a majority of the employees.7 Prompted by recent NLRB decisions,"
unions have relied increasingly upon this authorization card pro-
cedure.9
Designation by cards rests upon a strained reading of the National
Labor Relations Act.10 And beyond the question of interpretation, the
Board has failed to evaluate fairly the card procedure with reference
to important policy considerations.
Some of these policy considerations came to light during recent
Senate Hearings on repeal of section 14(b) of the Act, which permits
the states to enact right-to-work laws." Two members of the subcom-
mittee on labor proposed legislation to deal with some of the problems
raised by authorization cards.' 2 But neither the propriety nor the wis-
dom of the proposed legislative solutions can be considered without
fully understanding the nature of the problem and the Board's present
position.
6. I.e., status as a § 9(a) representative and thus entitled to the benefits of the act. See,
e.g., United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 72 n.8 (1956).
7. An "authorization card" can take many forms. Generally it is a printed form with
appropriate blanks for the employee's name and/or signature, employer's name, and date.
Some examples and suggested forms are found in Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authori.
zation Cards in Determining Union Majority, 16 LAB. L.J. 434 (1965); and see also Inter-
national Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 361, 363 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 902 (1965). The cards have been used for many years to show the requi-
site 30% interest needed to obtain a certification election, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1965);
but the type of card mentioned throughout this comment is an "authorization card"
meaning a card giving the union authority to represent the employees in collective bar-
gaining, or a "dual purpose" card, one giving the union authority to represent and/or
petition for an election under § 9(c).
8. Particularly Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), discussed at notes
82-89 infra and Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), enforced, 351 F.2d
917 (6th Cir. 1965).
9. For statistics on the increased number of cases in which the unions have ultimately
relied on the cards instead of on elections see Note, 33 U. Cmt. L REv. 387, 388 nn.7-11
(1966). Card supported bargaining orders in 1965 were up 50% from 1962; there were 286
in fiscal 1965.
10. Since the Act nowhere explicitly allows for authorization cards, their validity as
a device for making a union a § 9(a) representative is supported only by statutory con-
struction. See discussion at notes 30-31, 107-13 infra.
11. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on § 14(b)].
The policy consideration particularly emphasized was the protection of employee rights,
see text accompanying notes 192-204 infra.
12. Senator Javits of New York introduced two bills: S. 2133, June 14, 1965, and S. 2395,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., August 11, 1965, superseding his first bill. Senator Fannin of Arizona
introduced S. 2226, June 29, 1965. See text accompanying notes 192-20 infra.
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THE AUTHORIZATION CARD PROCEDURE
Usually an organizing union wishing to be designated by authoriza-
tion cards solicits signatures from employees, both at work and after
hours. 3 When a majority of employees has signed, 14 the union wr'ites
or telegraphs the employer alleging1 its majority status and requesting
formal bargaining.1 6 The union offers to prove its majority status by
submitting the cards to an independent third party,'- usually the min-
ister of the employer's choice,'8 for verification against employment
records.' 9 The union petitions the Board for an election either simul-
taneously or shortly afterward.20
If the employer voluntarily bargains with the union, the plant has
been organized and the union withdraws its election petition. But
even if the employer refuses recognition,21 the union may still succeed
in "organizing" the plant without winning an election. Should the
employer demonstrate, at the time the cards are presented, that he
does not doubt that the union has majority support, the Board may
deny him an election and order him to bargain with the union upon
its request.22 If the employer has good faith doubts about the union's
13. See Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 190 for the many places cards are solicited. Unions,
unlike employers, may take organizational efforts to employees' homes. Plant City Welding
& Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131 (1957). On home solicitation of cards see, e.g.. Universal
Metal Finishing, 156 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. ' 20,096 (1965). Some cards
are even solicited by mail to be filled out at home, Bauer Welding & 'Metal Fabricators,
Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9663, 60 LR.RM. 1070 (1965).
14. Although a union usually requests bargaining as soon as a bare majority signs.
they often continue their efforts. See, e.g., Benson Veneer Co., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 1966
CCH N.L.R.B. 20,148, 61 L.R.R.M. 1137 (1966) in which two cards, obtained 13 days
later, proved to be the margin of victory.
15. See, e.g., Irving Air Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964); Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 153 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9464 (1965).
16. See, e.g., Shopper's Fair, 151 N.L.R.B. No. 155, 1965 CCH N.LR.B. , 9261. 58
L.R R.M. 1658 (1965).
17. See, e.g., New England Liquor Sales Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B.
20,218, 61 L.RIR.M. 1314 (1966).
18. See, e.g., Ben Duthler, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 1966 CCH N.LR.B. C 20,216, 61
L.R-R.M. 1305 (1966); Kellogg Mills, 147 N.L.R.B. 342, 345 (1964) (where the union
brought a clergyman along with them).
19. See, e.g., Dixon Ford Shoe Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. C 9016,
58 LR.R.M. 1160 (1965); Fred Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961).
20. See, e.g., Harvard Coated Prods. Co., 156 N.IR.B. No. 4, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B.
20,076 (1965); Irving Air Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964); Bernel Foam Prods. Co..
146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964).
21. The employer may refuse immediately, e.g., New England Liquor Sales Co., 157
N.L.R.B. No. 16, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,218, 61 L.R.R.M. 1314 (1966), or may simply
stall the union inventing excuses and ignoring them, e.g., Permacold Indus., Inc., 147
N.L.R.B. 885 (1964); George Groh & Sons, 141 N.L.R.B. 931 (1963).
22. The employer's conduct at the time he receives the bargaining demand may reveal
that he believes the union has a majority. A card check may eliminate the union's need
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majority status, the union awaits the election-either an ordinary cer-
tification election,23 or, with the employer's consent, an expedited
election provided for by the Act.24 If the employer commits an unfair
labor practice before the secret ballot, the union may withdraw the
election petition, alleging that the unfair practice eliminates the pos-
sibility of a fair election. 25 Under the Board's present construction of
the Act,26 these unfair practices may lead to an order compelling bar-
gaining.27 Alternatively, the union may wait for the election, despite
possibly illegal pre-election employer conduct. If the union loses, it
may then allege that employer pre-election conduct constituted an
unfair labor practice. 2 Once again, the employer may be ordered to
for an election, Fred Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961). The commencement of actual
bargaining may have the same result, Jem Mfg., Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 1966 CCH
N.L.R.B. 20,128, 61 LR.R.M. 1074 (1966); N.L.R.B. v. Hyde, 339 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.
1964), enforcing, 145 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1963).
23. See, e.g., Dixie Cup, 157 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,217, 61 L.R.R.M.
1329 (1966); Gafner Automomotive & Machine Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 1966 CCH
N.L.R.B. 20,125 (1966); Western Saw Mfrs. Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B.
20,062 (1965).
24. See, e.g., J. M. Machinery Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B.
20,018, 60 L.R.R.M. 1414 (1965); Marvin A. Whitbeck, 155 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 1965 CCH
N.L.R.B. 9748, 60 L.R.R.M. 233 (1965). The consent election is authorized by § 9(c)(4)
of the Act, 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(4) (1964).
25. See, e.g., Crown Tar and Chemical Works, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 1965 CCH
N.L.R.B. 9632 (1965); Bause Super Drug Stores, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 160, 1965 CCH
N.L.R.B. 9091, 58 L.R.R.M. 1291 (1965).
26. The Board reasons that in light of these unfair practices, the employer could
have no good faith doubt of the union's majority, and his prior refusal to bargain thus
constitutes a violation of §8(a)(5):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - . . . to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
section 9(a).
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). See note 3 supra for § 9(a). For the full
legal theory see notes 32-42 infra and accompanying text.
Although the real issue is refusal to recognize, not refusal to bargain, the two words
are used interchangeably in the authorization card problem. Since the duty to bargain
arises immediately upon a union's recognition, however, there may be some logic in view-
ing the issue as a single one.
27. The leading case upholding the propriety of the bargaining order is Franks Bros.
Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
28. All conduct occurring after the filing of a petition may now be used to impeach
the validity of an election. This marks a recent extension both in stipulated elections,
Rockwell Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 890
(1964), and in consent elections, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 NL.R.B. 453 (1962).
For such pre-election violations subsequent to a card solicitation see, e.g., Irving Air
Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964); Colson Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 827 (1964), enforced, 347




bargain.2 9 No matter how it is obtained the compulsory bargaining
order allows the union to organize the plant without winning an
election.
The way to plant organization via authorization cards winds through
a complex legal maze. The theory authorizing this card procedure in-
volves the use of section 8(a)(5)30 (an unfair labor practice provision)
as a detour around section 9(c)31 (the secret ballot election provision).
The current interpretation of the relationship between sections 9(c)
and 8(a)(5) comes from Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB,32 a 1944 Supreme
Court decision uniting earlier decisions under the then young statute.33
This opinion upholds the propriety of the compulsory bargaining rem-
edy for a "refusal to recognize" upon presentation of authorization
cards. Franks Brothers committed an unfair labor practice34 in an ag-
gressive consent election campaign which followed after 45 of 80
employees had "designated" the union by signing cards. The union
withdrew its election petition, alleging that there was no possibility
for a fair election and the Board ordered compulsory bargaining as
the remedy for improper refusal to bargain upon presentation of the
cards.35 Franks Brothers challenged the propriety of the remedy, alleg-
ing that 13 of 45 signers no longer worked for it.30 The Board and
Court answered that as long as a majority supported the union at the
time of the illegal acts, a subsequent loss of majority support could
not bar the bargaining remedy.37 The Court declared the bargaining
order permissible under 10(c), the section authorizing the board to
fashion appropriate remedies. 38 Franks Bros. thus held compulsory
29. See, e.g., Bauer Welding 8& AMetal Fabricators, Inc., 154 N.LR.B. No. 82, 1965
CCH N.L.R.B. 9663, 60 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1965); Tuscon Ramada Caterers, Inc., 154
N.L.R.B. No. 44,1965 CCH N.L..B. 9631, 60 L.RR.M. 1001 (1965). The normal remedy
for an overturned election is a re-run election. See Note, Employee Choice and Some
Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation Campaigns, 72 YA=I .J. 1243, 1257
(1963).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964), see note 26 supra.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964), see note 4 supra.
32. 321 US. 702 (1944).
33. NLRFB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512 (1942); NLRB v. Fanstel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 US. 240 (1939).
34. Supervisory employees "sought to undermine the majority status of the union"
by making statements to the effect that the plant would dose if the union won; a viola-
tion of 8(1) of the Wagner Act now 8(a)(1) of the present Act, see note 67 infra, NLRB
v. Franks Bros. Co., 137 F.2d 989, 991-92 (1st Cir. 1943), aff'd, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
35. Franks Bros. Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 898 (1942).
36. 321 U.S. at 703.
37. 321 US. at 705.
38. 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964):
Sec. 10(c) ... If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall
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bargaining an appropriate remedy when (1) the union was a section
9(a) representative, and (2) the refusal to bargain was improper.3 9
Although section 9(a) does not provide any procedure for determin-
ing whether there is a majority,40 the courts apparently construe "rep-
resentative designated or selected" in the alternative.41 A union attains
its exclusive 9(a) status if "selected" by a secret ballot, or if "desig-
nated" by any other appropriate method, including, as in Franks Bros.,
authorization cards.
42
The second prerequisite to an 8(a)(5) violation, an improper refusal
to bargain, relates to the employer's conduct. Cases subsequent to
Franks Bros. establish that this conduct will be evaluated by good faith
standards.43 In the leading case of Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB,44 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enforced a compulsory
bargaining order and, for the first time, clearly articulated the test of
good faith which applied to a refusal to bargain upon presentation of
cards. The union had presented the employer with cards from 38 of
52 employees; the employer refused to allow a neutral party to check
be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or Is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings
of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirma-
tive action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
39. These two requirements must be proved in every case, or disproved if the employer
wants to avoid the order to bargain.
40. See United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71 (1956).
41. 351 U.S. at 74, 75. The court repeatedly refers to the card supported union as
"designated."
42. 321 U.S. at 705. The Union is similarly referred to as "designated." The Impor-
tance of the "designation" to the order to bargain can be seen in two types of cases. In
one, although the employer has violated the Act, the union never obtains a factual ma-
jority of cards, e.g., J. P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 61 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1966)
(massive violations of virtually every type), NLRB v. Koehler, 328 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1964)
(employer's good faith irrelevant once the union's majority was not proved); in the other,
the union proceeds to an election before seeking a bargaining order on the cards and
fails to impeach the election loss. If the election loss stands, the Board cannot rely on the
cards. See, e.g., Kolpin Bros., 149 N.L.R.B. 1378 (1964), analyzed in Note, 29 ALBANY L.
REv. 368 (1965).
43. The employer must have a "good faith" doubt that the union lacks status as a
majority representative. It should be noted, however, that in order to prevent him from
retaliating against those of his employees who have supported the union, the employer
has been denied access to the major source of legitimation for such doubts: the union's
cards, which are supposed to be shown only to a neutral cross-checker. See, e.g., NLRB v.
George Groh & Sons, 329 F.2d 265, 269 (10th Cir. 1964).
44. 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
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the signatures against employment records. His refusal to recognize
the union forced an election which the union lost.4" The Board sus-
tained the union's complaint that the employer's unfair labor practices
in connection with the campaign destroyed the validity of the elec-
tion.4 6 It further held that the unfair practices and refusal to partici-
pate in a card check proved the employer had no good faith doubt
about the union's majority status. 47 The refusal to recognize the union
thus constituted an 8(a)(5) violation. In finding an 8(a)(5) violation,
the Court stated that
an employer may refuse recognition of a union when motivated
by a good faith doubt as to that union's majority status [citation
omitted]. When, however, such refusal is due to a desire to gain
time and to take action to dissipate the union's majority, the re-
fusal is no longer justifiable and constitutes a violation of the duty
to bargain set forth in section 8(a)(5) of the Act [citations
omitted]. 4
8
The Court's analysis focuses upon the employer's motivation at the
time of his initial refusal to bargain, but the test which developed
from the case imputes independent meaning to each of the court's state-
ments.49 Under the Joy Silk test eventually adopted in every circuit,O
the bad faith of the employer's refusal can be established in either of
two ways: (1) by showing that at the time the union presented its cards
he could have had no good faith doubts about its majority status8 1 or
45. The union lost 32 to 16. Joy Silk Mills Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1270 (1949).
46. 85 N.L.R.B. at 1288. The employer violated 8(a)(l) by promising benefits (rest
periods and shift rotations) and interrogating employees as to their union sentiments. Id.
at 1286-88.
47. 85 N.L.R.B. at 1288. The Trial Examiner said that if the employer's good faith
had continued, assuming it was bona fide at the start, he either would not have inter-
fered with the consent election or would have voluntarily bargained with the union. The
employer could not doubt the union's status if he committed the acts which made the
election impossible.
48. 185 F.2d at 741. All the citations were to pre-Taft-Hartley decisions.
49. A violation of either part of the test alone suffices. See, e.g., NLRB v. George Groh
8- Sons, 329 F.2d 265, 269 (10th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Philamon Labs., Inc., 298 F.2d 176
(2d Cir. 1962).
50. NLRB v. Whitelight Prods. Div., 298 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1962) (by indirect ap-
proval); NLRB v. Pyne Molding Corp., 226 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Epstein,
203 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1953); Bilton Insulation, Inc. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 141 (4th Cir.
1961); NLRB v. Stewart, 207 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Armco Drainage & Metal
Prods., Inc., 220 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Jackson Press, Inc., 201 F.2d 541 (7th
Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Decker, 296 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Trimfit of California.
Inc., 211 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Hamilton, 220 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1955).
51. See, e.g., Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1962).
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(2) by showing misconduct tending to dissipate the union's strength
subsequent to his initial refusal. 52 The second part of the test converts
subsequent misconduct into a nearly conclusive presumption of pre-
vious bad faith.
53
The Joy Silk test has thus been applied in two groups of cases. In
the first group, the employer acts improperly at the time of the card
presentation. 54 Citing the employer's repeated refusal to answer the
union's request for an election 5 or his admission that he wanted an
election even though the cards accurately showed a majority, " or other
actions inconsistent with good faith doubt about the union's majority
status, 57 the Board finds that his refusal to bargain was in bad faith.
The standard is especially strict when the refusal comes after a card
check.58 If the card check indicates a majority of signatures, the courts
insist that the employer must have known that the union in fact had
52. This constitutes the most frequent use of Joy Silk. See, e.g., S.N.C. Manufacturing
Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 809, 810 (1964), enforced per curiam, International Union of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Daylight Grocery Co., 147 N.LR.B. 133,
742 (1964), enforced, 345 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1965).
53. See, e.g., the Trial Examiner's reasoning in Joy Silk Mills Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263,
1288 (1949), and NLRB v. Austin Powder Co., 350 F.2d 973, 977 (6th Cir. 1965). The
court enforced an order to bargain based on the Board's finding that the previous doubt
was a sham. The misconduct was described as "rejection of the principle of collective
bargaining," 141 N.L.R.B. 183 (1963). In its final form, the presumption becomes a con-
clusion by the Board, which the courts overrule only when there is not "subtsantlal
evidenced on the record viewed as a whole," Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951); see also NLRB v. George Groh & Sons, 329 F.2d 265, 266 (10th Cir. 1964).
54. This group of cases stands apart because the employer is not found guilty of
any unfair labor practice other than the refusal to bargain. See, e.g., NLRB v. C. J.
Glasgow Co., 356 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1966) in which the employer made no effort to
discover information to justify his doubt of majority status and relied on the union's
having filed an election petition, enforcing as modified 148 N.L.R.B. 98 (1964).
55. See, e.g., Air Filter Sales & Service, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B 384 (1963); Henry Spen & Co.,
150 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 1964 CCH N.L.R.B. 13,672, 58 L.R.R.M. 1048 (1964).
56. See, e.g., George Groh & Sons, 141 N.L.R.B. 931 (1963), enforced, 329 F.2d 265
(10th Cir. 1964); Fleming & Sons, 147 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1279 (1964); Greyhound Terminal,
137 N.L.R.B. 87 (1962), enforced, 314 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1963).
57. See, e.g., Jem Mfg., Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 1 20,128, 61
L.R.R.M. 1074 (1966), where the employer first intimated he would recognize union, then
reneged; NLRB v. Hyde, 339 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964), enforcing, 145 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1964),
where the employer signed a contract the day of the card check, under threat of picket-
ing, and refused to bargain five days later when nine employees sent him a petition saying
they had signed cards only in the belief they were necessary for an election, 339 F.2d
at 571.
58. See, e.g., Dixon Ford Shoe Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9016,




a majority.59 The minister of his choice counted the cards; how could
he in good faith doubt the truth of the union's claim?0
In a second group of cases, the employer commits unfair labor prac-
tices subsequent to his initial refusal."' Whether committed in an ef-
fort to impugn the union's alleged card majority, or in campaigning
before the secret ballot, the employer's unfair practicesG2 are held to
show a desire to dissipate union strength. 3 Having found this desire
to undermine the union, the Board almost invariably presumes that
the employer's prior refusal was motivated solely by a desire to gain
time to engage in anti-union activity. 4 Thus, the subsequent miscon-
duct proves that the employer previously had no good faith doubt of
the union's majority status; the refusal to recognize when the cards
were presented violated section 8(a)(5).05
Under this presumption that unfair practices later in time conclu-
59. See, e.g., Kellogg Mills, supra note 58; Snow & Sons, 134 N.I.R.B. 709 (1961),
enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
60. See, e.g., Snow & Sons, supra note 59; in Dixon Ford Shoe Co., 150 N.L.IB. No.
86, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9016, 58 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1965), a judge did the checkng.
61. Generally, the relevant unfair practices occur after the bargaining demand. If
they occur before, the union must show that the employer was aware of the card drive.
E.g., Hunt Oil Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 1966 CCH N.L.P-B. I 20,223. 61 PLR.M. 1865
(1966); cf. Don Swart Trucking Co., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 115, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9696, 60
L. .-R.M. 1219 (1965).
62. Unfair practices generally fall into two groups, though the distinction often
breaks down. The first group contains unfair practices related to the cards: efforts to
induce employees to repudiate the cards or to discover employee sentiment for the union.
The second group relates to the election: the customary forbidden pre-election conduct
such as promises of economic benefits or threats of reprisal if the union wits. Discharges
of pro-union employees, since they do not alter the original card presentation, fall
generally in the latter group.
63. See, e.g., Permacold Indus., Inc., 147 N.L.P.B. 885, 887 (1964); New England
Liquor Sales Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 1966 CCH N.L.PUB. 20,218, 61 LR.R.M. 1315,
1316 (1966); Daylight Grocery Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 733, 742 (1964), enforced, 345 F.2d 239
(5th Cir. 1965).
64. See, e-g, Colson Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 827, 829 (1964), enforced, 347 F.2d 128 (8th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965); NLRB v. Elliott-Williams Co., 345 F.2d 460,
464 (7th Cir. 1965), enforcing 143 N.L.R.B. 811 (1963).
65. The curious reasoning that violation of § 8(a)(5) in effect gives the union the
status as a § 9(a) representative, which in turn allows the finding of a violation of
§ 8(a)(5), has seemed circular to at least one Board member. Leedom, dissenting in
Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 1291 (1964), pointed out that "the majority
begs the question when it argues that the 8(a)(5) charges should be entertained because
the [employer] violated 8(a)(5) .. " And as one commentator has noted concerning the
use of "good faith" to analyze the employer's conduct, "It would be artificial to analyze
these cases [on recognition] in terms of good faith; that concept is not relevant until
the bargaining relationship is established." Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search
of Policy, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 248, 268 (1964).
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sively demonstrate prior intent, the Joy Silk test operated for many
years as a per se rule.66 Virtually any unfair labor practice precluded
the employer from proving good faith doubt when the cards were pre-
sented and triggered the order to bargain: questioning about union
activity,67 unilateral grants of economic benefits,08  surveillance,09
threats, 70 discriminatory discharge,71 promises of economic benefits,
72
encouraging company unions73 and even polling to test the majority
66. Although the Joy Silk test says nothing about unfair labor practices being neces-
sary for finding lack of doubt of majority status, the per se use of Joy Silk makes any
unfair practice per se a showing of a lack of good faith doubt of majority status.
67. Interrogation violates § 8(a)(1):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- . . . to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ....
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964). See, e.g., Copeland Oil Co., 157 N.L.R.B.
No. 12, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,214, 61 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1966); Dixie Color Printing
Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,205, 61 L.R.R.M. 1285 (1966);
Swan Super Cleaners, 152 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9285, 59 L.R.R.M. 1054
(1965); Mid-West Towel & Linen Service, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 744 (1963), enforced, 339 F.2d
958 (7th Cir. 1964).
68. Also a violation of § 8(a)(1). See, e.g., Tony R. Santangelo, 154 N.L.R.B No. 138,
1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9714, 60 L.R.R.M. 1254 (1965). Tucson Ramada Caterers, Inc., 154
N.L.R.B. No. 44, 1965 CCH N.LR.B. 9631, 60 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1965); Mantzowitz Mfg.
Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9581, 59 L.R.R.M. 1670 (1965); Frantz
& Co., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9550, 59 L.R.R.M. 1645 (1965); Fritchof
A. Fosdal, 153 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9433, 59 L.R.R.M. 1446 (1965).
69. On surveillance, a § 8(a)(1) violation, see, e.g., Piggly Wiggly El Dorado Co., 154
N.L.R.B. No. 32, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9624, 59 L.R.R.M. 1759 (1965); Comfort, Inc.,
152 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9386, 59 L.R.R.M. 1260 (1965); Sullivan
Surplus Sales, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9290, 59 L.R.R.M. 1041
(1965); Smeco Indus., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9235, 58
L.R.R.M. 1592 (1965).
70. On threats, see, e.g., Samuel B. Gass, 154 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B.
9647, 60 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1965); Southwestern Transp. Co., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 1965
CCH N.L.R.B. 9610, 59 L.R.R.M. 1753 (1965); Donald Skillings, 152 N.L.R.B. No. 108,
1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9373, 59 L.R.R.M. 1302 (1965); Associated Beer Depots, Inc., 152
N.L.R.B. No. 44, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9314, 59 L.R.R.M. 1102 (1965).
71. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964):
Sec. 8(a). It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- . . . (3) by dlis-
crimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ....
See, e.g., B.B.S.A., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9162, 58 L.R.R.M.
1507 (1965); Shoppers Fair, 151 N.L.R.B. No. 155, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9261, 58 L.R.R.M.
1658 (1965).
72. The promises violate § 8(a)(1), see, e.g., Bause Super Drug Stores Inc., 150 N.L.R.B.
No. 160, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9091, 58 L.R.R.M. 1291 (1965); Hamburg Shirt Corp., 156
N.L.R.B. No. 51, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,123, 61 L.R.R.M. 1075 (1965).
73. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 129 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1964):
Sec. 8(a). It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- ... (2) to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or con-
tribute financial or other support to it....
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status. 74 In September, 1965, however, the Board denied that Joy Silk
had operated as a per se rule.70 It held that an employer who had ille-
gally interrogated a few employees nonetheless had demonstrated that
his prior doubt was in good faith. However, it is questionable whether
the interrogation in this case was illegal.70 More important, the Board's
continued use of Joy Silk as a per se rule in the vast majority of cases
suggests that it may have made only a token gesture in an easy case.-,
In both groups of cases, then, the Board's General Counsel has only
to make out a prima facie case-to prove any of the acts which give
rise to the presumption of bad faith-and the burden shifts to the
employer, who must justify his doubt about the union's status.-, Under
See, e.g., Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 82. 1965 CCH
N.L.R.B. 9663 (1965); Laura Jayne, Inc., 152 N.LR.B. No. 139, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B.
9404, 59 L.MR.RM 1289 (1965).
74. Such polling may frequently constitute 8(a)(1) violations: e.g., NLRB v. Mid-West
Towel & Linen Service, Inc., 339 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1964), enforcing 143 N.LR.B. 744
(1963); Hamburg Shirt Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 1966 CCH N.LR.B. 20,123, 61
L.R.R.M. 1075 (1965); Pizza Prods. Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 78, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B.
9524 (1965).
75. Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 1965 CCH N.LR.B. (] 9681. 60
L.R .M. 1073 (1965).
76. The "interrogation" was relatively innocuous questioning of 6 emplo)Ces out of
110, asking them how they intended to vote in the pending elections. Furthermore, the
case was easily decided on other grounds since the Trial Examiners found that the union
did not have a valid majority of cards. The Board did not reach the card issue, 60
L.R.R.M. at 1074.
77. E.g., Hammond & Irving, Inc., supra note 75, the cards majority may have been
insufficient; in John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 N.LR.B. No. 12, 1965 CCH N.LR.B. C 9753, 60
L.R.R.M. 1235 (1965), the Trial Examiner called the union's majority "fleeting and
evanescent" since two employees repudiated the union immediately; in Oklahoma Shera-
ton Corp., 156 N.LR.B. No. 69, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,135, 61 L..R.M. 1115 (1966),
the Trial Examiner had found doubt over the appropriate union sufficient to support
the employer's doubt; in Harvard Coated Prods. Co., 156 N.LR.B. No. 4, 1965 CCH
N.L.R.B. 20,076 (1965), the only § 8(a)(1) violation was by a supervisor specifically
instructed not to talk about the union. Yet in these cases, the Board talked about the
General Counsel's failure to sustain his burden of proving the employer's good faith.
Meanwhile the vast majority of cases find bad faith "automatically" upon the commission
of unfair labor practices, and the courts must abide by the determination unless there
is insufficient evidence for the Board to reasonably conclude that the original refusal
was in bad faith. Jas. H. Matthews & Co. v. NLRB, 354 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1965); Joy
Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1950). A good example of the "nev"
per se rule in action occurred in Ben Duthler, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 1966 CCH
N.L.R.B. 20,216, 61 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1966) in which an employer opposed the union at
two separate stores. One led to an 8(a)(5) solution, standard variety, the other, at a new
store, did not. But the latter was an easy case. The store had not opened when the
drive started, and the evidence shows that another union was also interested in the new
employees.
78. Reliance on doubts as to the proper unit is no defense. See, e.g., Southland Paint
Co., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,083, 60 L.R.R.M. 1546 (1965). If an
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the Joy Silk test, this burden has been almost impossible to sustain.
The employer acts at his peril-at least since 1964.
79
Joy Silk was decided in 1950; but from 1954 to 1964, a procedural
obstacle limited the utility of authorization cards as a union organizing
weapon.80 During this period, the union could present cards and the
employer's unfair practices could lead to an 8(a)(5) bargaining order.
But if the union filed an election petition, the Board considered au-
thorization cards irrelevant to the question of representation.,, There-
fore, unfair labor practices committed by the employer either before
or after the petition, which arguably will prove the employer's bad
faith doubt of majority status, could not lead to a bargaining order
supported by the cards. Filing an election petition barred the union
from alleging employer misconduct prior to the petition.
In 1964, in Bernel Foam Products Co.,82 the Board dropped the bar
created by a petition and restored authorization cards as a lethal union
organizing weapon.83 Now, the wise union always solicits authorization
cards before petitioning for an election.8 4 Since the petition is no
longer a bar, a pre-petition demand that an employer bargain on the
basis of cards establishes the necessary precondition which may ripen
into an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain. 5 Unfair labor practices committed
employer has doubts he must do something to resolve them. Kay Allen Classics, Inc.,
152 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 1965 CCH N.LR.B. 9401, 59 L.R.R.M. 1308 (1965).
79. See NLRB v. Elliott-Wiliams Co., 345 F.2d 460, 464 (7th Cir. 1965).
80. This procedure stemmed from Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954). Aiello
was a departure from the earlier rule found in H. M. Davidson Co., 94 N.L.R.B 142
(1951).
81. The theory was apparently two-fold, (1) that cards and election were inconsistent
procedures to use in proving a majority-the cards assumed a majority existed; and (2)
without the rule elections could be held while 8(a)(5) charges were pending, thus increas-
ing expense and administrative burden; 110 N.L.R.B. at 1368-70. See Note 33 U. Cini. L.
REV. 387, 401-02 (1966).
82. 146 N.LR.X. 1277 (1964) (endorsed in International Union of Elec. Workers v.
NLRB, 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965)); see Note, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 456 (1965), Note, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 866 (1964).
83. Since Bernel Foam the number of cases involving cards has risen drastically. See
note 9 supra. In fiscal 1965 alone, the increase was 36%. For a brief outline of union
strategy see Shuman, Requiring a Union to Demonstrate Its Majority Status by Means
of Election Becomes Riskier, 16 LA. L.J. 426 (1965).
84. For an example of the precise impact of Bernel Foam see Colson Corp., 148
N.L.R.B. 827 (1964), in which the Bernel rule necessitated extensive modification of the
Trial Examiner's conclusion. One commentator has declared that the unions now have
"the best of both worlds," Shuman, supra note 83 at 433.
85. Under the Joy Silk rationale, any subsequent unfair labor practice, after the card
presentation, warrants the finding of an 8(a)(5) violation. If the employer acts carefully
at the time the cards are presented, the defeat of the subsequent unfair practice may
well eliminate the 8(a)(5) charge. E.g., Peter Paul, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 1966 CCH
N.L.R.B. 20,192, 61 L.R.R.M. 1277 (1966).
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during an election campaign can now create a presumption that the
employer acted improperly when the cards were presented to him.
Since this presumption is difficult to reverse, a bargaining order will
usually follow. This situation is aggravated since conduct normally
permissible frequently constitutes an unfair labor practice in the con-
text of an election campaign.80
The judicial endorsement of authorization cards provides unions
with rather efficient election insurance. On occasion, the Board and the
courts have made articulate the conception of the Act by which they
justify side-stepping the secret ballot. They import into the Act the
deceptively simple maxim that a man should not benefit from his own
wrong.8 7 Thus in Bernel Foam, when the employer interfered with the
efficacy of the election, he could not be permitted the luxury of the
ordinary remedy, a re-run election.8 Parties who destroy the election
process usually win on such re-runs;80 the employer must not be al-
lowed to benefit from his misconduct. As the court argued earlier in
Joy Silk, the secret ballot surely was not intended to provide the em-
ployer with a procedural weapon to defeat unionization. 0
In other words, the Board views the problem solely as one of remedy.
When an intransigent employer commits unfair labor practices in or-
der to win an election, the Board can remedy his violations by using
a limited number of devices: re-run elections, cease and desist orders,
and, on occasion, injunctions. 91 These remedies require protracted ad-
minstrative action, hearings, litigation, and appeal, which sometimes
86. If the union proceeds with an election and loses, the election loss must be i-
peached. Kolpin Bros. Co., 149 N.LR.B. 1378 (1964). In the context of elections, border-
line cases easily become violations. See, e.g., Copeland Oil Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 1966
CC NL.R.B. 20,214, 61 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1966), where questioning an employee became
illegal because of the pending election; Prepared Statement of Thomas E. Shroycr, Senate
Hearings on § 14(b), 180, 183.
87. The employer should be denied "any benefit from its unlawful refusal." Bernel
Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 1281 (1964). See also Sandier, Another Worry for
Employers, U.S. News S.- World Report, March 15, 1965. Reprinted in Senate Hearings
on § 14(b), 190-94.
88. The "principle ... serves as a valuable ... deterrent to employer interferences."
Memorandum from Secretary Wirtz to Senator Javits, Senate Hearings on § 14(b). 24.
The employer is not allowed to "reap the benefits." Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB, 350
F.2d 176, 182 (2d Cir. 1965).
89. See Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N. CAP. L. REv. 209, 212 (1963):
the results changed only in "a third" of re-run elections in 1960, 1961, and in the first
nine months of fiscal 1962.
90. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
91. See generally Note, 72 YAE U.J. 1243, 1257 (1963), and, on injunctions, Bok. The
Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. Ray. 38, 128-29 (1964).
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lasts for years. Therefore, the wilfully anti-union employer has nothing
to lose from repeated violations except the expense, disruption, and
inconvenience of Board orders and re-run elections. The bargaining
order precludes the employer from capitalizing on repeated unfair
labor practices. Furthermore, by compelling the one thing the obsti-
nate employer seeks to avoid, the bargaining order hopefully provides
an effective deterrent to other employers faced with unionization.
The ultimate justification for this remedy, however, must be the
protection of employee free choice. The Act authorizes the Board to
protect employee free choice, not to penalize the employer.92 Conced-
ing arguendo that a re-run election is not a wholly adequate remedy,3
the availability and propriety of the bargaining order as an alternative
remedy nevertheless requires two assumptions: first, that a majority
of authorization cards is not only an accurate index of majority sup-
port, but is more accurate than the election which they replace; and
second, that if the employer does not and should not have an absolute
right to an election, then his subjective belief about the union's ma-
jority status properly delineates the class of case in which he may be
deprived of an election. Neither assumption survives examination.
Authorization cards are an unreliable index of employee choice.
Compared with the secret ballot they replace, their solicitation is a woe-
fully defective process, guaranteeing to employees neither a free nor
a reasoned choice. Their admitted inferiority to a properly conducted
secret ballot should preclude their use absolutely when the employer
has not committed an unfair practice interfering with employee free
choice. And even when the employer does illegally interfere with free
choice, authorization cards are so unreliable that a re-run election-
92. The Board's mandate to safeguard employer choice derives ultimately from § 7 of
the Act, note 114 supra, which guarantees, generally, three employee rights: to organize;
to choose between unions; and to refrain from organizing. See the excellent analysis In
Summers, Freedom of Association and Compulsory Unionism in Sweden and the United
States, 112 U. PA. L. Rv. 647, 694-95 (1964). In prohibiting even marginal employer
coercion, the Board protects the right to organize. See, e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962). In protecting the right to choose between unions the Board Itself
has labelled cards a "notoriously unreliable method of determining majority status of
a union .. " Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546, 550.51 (1952). In the recent decision In
NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1965), the court recognized In dictum
that the authorization card procedure similarly may undercut the right to refrain. Ap-
parently no one denies that the secret election procedure provides a more accurate reflec-
tion of employees' true desires than a check of authorization cards. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Hannaford Bros., 261 F.2d 638, 641 (1st Cir. 1958); Wirtz, supra note 88 at 19.
93. Of course, a re-run is not a negligible affair, and does interrupt the normal oper-
ation of any employer. The administrative proceedings cost the employer time and
money, especially if they lead to litigation.
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or two or three or ten-better protects employee freedom. A causal
relationship between employer misconduct and election results has
never been proven, despite statistical94 and scientific case studies. 05 It
is as likely as not that a union loss, even when the employer has com-
mitted unfair practices in the campaign, accurately reflects employee
wishes. 96 Statistics on authorization cards, on the other hand, have cor-
roborated their unreliability.97 It is ironic that the Board denies an
election or re-run in order to protect employee free choice and then
orders bargaining on the basis of cards which offer even less protection.
The second assumption, that the good faith belief of the employer
regarding the union's majority determines whether he is entitled to
an election, runs counter to the face and pattern of the statute and its
legislative history. More important, the good faith test obscures the
important issue about employee choice by making the issuance of a
bargaining order depend upon an unrelated and grossly unsophisti-
cated conception of employer motivation. 8 If the real issue is the de-
vising of remedies to protect employee free choice, it is particularly
difficult to justify depriving both employees and employers of an elec-
tion when there has been neither unfair labor practices nor an election
campaign.
Finally, in all its applications, the good faith test overlooks entirely
employer rights incident to a 9(c) secret ballot.9 0 The good faith test
assumes that the need to deter employer misconduct outweighs other
important policies of the Act.100
94. See, e.g., Pollitt, supra note 89. The statistics in this study justify no conclusion
about the causality between employer and union conduct and election results.
95. See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elec-
tions Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 -Lxv. L. REv. 38 (1964); Note, 72 YAIx
Lj. 1243 (1963).
96. In response to suggestions that the employer have an absolute right to an election.
Secretary Wirtz argues that the employer needs no such protection. Although clear and
unequivocal cards do evidence a desire to be represented-the known desires of the
employees for unionism-if the employer insists on an election and does nothing else,
Secretary Wirtz insists he can have one. Despite the fact that the present state of the
law does not support Secretary Wirtz, he is accurate in stating that employer choice
and employer conduct are two different matters, and that the propriety of the remedy
rests on an assumption that the cards actually reflect the wishes of the employees.
Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 19-25.
97. See note 156 infra.
98. See commentary in Loomis, Determination of Union Majority Status, 47 CalL BAn
REcoRa 113, 116-18 (1965).
99. These are the statutory benefits which attach to an election, the one year election
bar of § 9(c)(3), the freedom from harassment from second unions in § 8(b)(7), the right
to campaign against the union guaranteed by § 8(c).
100. See text accompanying note 189 infra. Secretary Wirtz suggests a justification of
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The history of the NLRA, particularly the revisions of 1947, strongly
suggest that the secret ballot was intended to provide an exclusive pro-
cedure for selecting a bargaining representative. 10' Before 1947, section
9(c) empowered the Board, in deciding a question of representation,
to "take a secret ballot of employees or utilize any other suilable
method to ascertin [sic] such representative.' 02  The Taft-Hartley
revisers completely rewrote section 9(c), providing only the secret bal-
lot procedure for deciding a question of representation. 10 3 The major-
ity and minority reports of Senator Taft's committee suggest that the
section was revised to grant the employer an absolute right to an elec-
tion.10 4 The right was granted in the face of minority arguments that
an employer could use it to work against unions. 10 5 The use of cards in
lieu of elections apparently had been quite prevalent before 1947; the
minority report lamented their elimination. 100
Despite this legislative history, the courts have endorsed the pre-
revision interpretation of section 9(a) permitting a union to become
an exclusive representative without a 9(c) election. 107 The opening
the focus on employer misconduct in his memorandum to Senator Javits by declaring It
"the fundamental purpose of the act to encourage collective bargaining," Senate Hearings
on § 14(b), 25.
101. Under the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935),
the Labor Board was not required to utilize the secret ballot, but they used tile lection
to resolve representation questions whenever possible since elections best effectuated the
policies of the Act. The Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526, 531-32 (1939).
102. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 453 (1935). (Emphasis added.)
103. The Senate's proposal for the new § 9(c) was eventually adopted by the com-
mittee of conference although the House also fully intended to reverse the prior practice
and make it a statutory right for an employer to obtain an election even when only one
union claimed representation. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1917). The
old option of election by other means was gone. Id. at 55-56. In reporting on § 8(a)(5),
Mr. Hartley's committee suggested changing "subject to the provisions of section 9(a)"
to "currently recognized by the employer or certified as such (exclusive representative)
under section 3." Id. at 30, 53. But the change was dropped in conference with no reason
given. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947). Perhaps the conferees felt the
thorough revision of § 9(c) obviated any need to change § 8(a)(5). The House Minority
Report suggests that the main concern with § 8(a)(5) was related to the subject of bar-
gaining as distinct from recognition. H.R. REP. No. 245 at 82.
104. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., Part 1, 25, Part 2, 11 (1947).
105. Id., Part 2, 11.
106. Id. at 34; the cards were apparently used in over 20% of the adjusted repre-
sentation cases.
107. See, e.g., NLRB v. Philamon Labs., Inc., 298 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
The controlling case continually cited is United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring
Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956). The Court there had to find an 8(a)(5) duty to bargain when the
union was unable to obtain a certification or election because it had not complied with the
old non-communist provisions of §§ 9(f, (g), & (h). After pointing out that § 9(a) says
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words of section 9(a), "Representatives designated or selected," are
read to imply that there is more than one procedure for registering
employee choice.108 But another construction, equally plausible tex-
tually, is consistent with allowing elections to be the exclusive proce-
dure. Both "designated" and "selected" describe election by secret
ballot, "designated" referring to the single union and "selected" to the
multi-union contest.
Neither the terms of section 9(a) nor the six references to it in the
Act require it to serve any purpose other than to attach exclusive status
to an elected union.109 Whether the Act deals with the closed shop,
10
the duty to bargain,"' or the invocation of election procedures," 2 9(a)
defines what kinds of unions are included in the provisions, not what
procedure the Board can use to determine when the union fits the
9(a) definition. But despite the apparently definitional role of 9(a) and
the Taft-Hartley revision of 9(c), the courts have endorsed, with shock-
ingly little analysis, the Board's construction of 9(a) as justifying the
card detour"n
3
At the same time as the secret ballot became an exclusive method
of selection under 9(c), section 7 was expanded to guarantee employees
the right to refrain from organizing;" 4 "and that right is implemented
nothing about how representatives are to be chosen and citing for authority a 1942 case.
id. at 71, the Court cited in footnote 8, id. at 72, several cases, many involving authoriza-
tion cards, which had held that an election was not the only way to attain exclusive status.
Throughout the opinion, the mineworkers are referred to as "designated." See also note 42
supra.
108. Before the Taft-Hartley revisions, the ways in which the union %%as "designated"
were many: applications for membership in union, registration cards, participation in
strike vote, participation in a strike, acceptance of strike benefits and authorized check-
off of union dues. See, e.g., Lebanon Steel Foundry v. NLRB, 130 F.2d 404, 40.08 (D.C.
Cir. 1942), and cases cited at notes 6-10 therein.
109. Section 9(a) appears as a cross reference in § 8(a)(3), the closed shop proviso.
and in § 8(d), allowing termination of some of the specific duties of bargaining, if loss
of exclusive status occurs.
110. Section 8(a)(3) provides inter alia that "nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude
an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a
condition of employment membership therein ... if such labor organization is the repre-
sentative of the employees as provided in section 9(a) .. "
111. This includes both the general duty to bargain of § 8(a)(5). see note 26 supra,
and the specific duties of bargaining spelled out in § 8(d).
112. See text of § 9(c)(1), note 4 supra.
113. The courts consistently cite pre-Taft-Hartley cases for their authority. or cases
which in turn cite pre-1947 decisions, with no consideration of the intervening changes
in the law. See note 118 infra.
114. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
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by § 9(c)(1) which provides for representation elections by secret
ballot."115 Despite these extensive revisions, in virtually every authori-
zation card case the Court relies on Franks Bros. v. NLRB for the pro-
priety of the compulsory bargaining remedy. 1 6 The endorsement of
this remedy in Franks Bros. may have effectuated the policies of the
Act in 1944, but in 1947 the policies changed."17 Nevertheless, pre-1947
precedent that secret elections were not exclusive has survived unex-
amined, screened by a myriad of cross-citations to precedents which
endorse cards without reflection.1 8 The key case holding that an em-
ployer has no vested right to an election, for example, is a post-revision
case adjudicating a controversy which arose under the old law."i9 Since
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities ...
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). (Emphasis added.) See also Summers, Freedom
of Association and Compulsory Unionism in Sweden and the United States, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 647, 666 (1964): "In the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, the individual's free-
dom to refrain from collective action became a dominant theme."
115. NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1965).
116. 321 U.S. 702 (1944). See, e.g., NLRB v. Philamon Labs., Inc., 298 F.2d 176,
182 (2d Cir. 1962). This is the only case that even suggests that Congress may not have
intended the bargaining order to survive the 1947 amendments in card cases, But the
reliance on legislative silence is not particularly justified since the only amendment since
1947, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum.Grifiths
Act), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), came at a time when the use of cards was quite infrequent.
For a typical use of Franks Bros. see NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 52 CCH Lab. Cas.
16,845 (2d Cir. 1966).
117. "[IThe policy of encouraging the spread of union organization and collective bar-
gaining yielded to official indifference." Cox, LAW AND mmE NATIONAL LABOR POLIcY
15 (1960). This change, reflected throughout the Act, is particularly evident In § 7, which
"places the rights not to organize, not to bargain collectively, and not to engage in
concerted activities upon a parity with the original rights to engage in such activities."
Id. at 39.
118. For instance, the authorities for the Joy Silk test (see text at note 48 supra) were
four pre-1947 decisions. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRIB, 185 F.2d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
The decisions cited in United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring, 351 U.S. 62, 71,
72 n.2 (1955), are either pre-1947 cases, or decisions by Courts of Appeals which similarly
are supported by rote citation of old cases. It should be noted that although Arkansas
Oak Flooring stands today as controlling precedent for the rule that cards will create
the duty to bargain (e.g., New England Liquor Sales Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 1966 CCH
N.L.R.B. 20,218, 61 L.R.R.M. 1314, 1315 (1966)) in footnote 2 of the opinion tile
court clearly stated that it was not considering "the questions that would have been
presented if there had been a bona fide dispute as to the existence of authorization
from a majority of the eligible employees." 351 U.S. at 68 n.2.
119. lob v. Los Angeles Brewing Co., 183 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1950), though decided
after the act was amended, explicitly was decided with reference to the old version of
§ 9(c), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), cited in full at 403 of the opinion. This case In turn consti.
tutes the authority for the holding in NLRB v. Trimfit of California, Inc., 211 F.2d 206,
209 (9th Cir. 1954), currently cited as the controlling case for an employer's not having
an absolute right to an election as he would appear to have on the face of the statute.
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1964, the use of authorization cards has increased significantly. The
propriety of circumventing the apparently exclusive provisions of 9(c)
must be supported by more than the recitation of ancient and unrea-
soned precedent. An examination of the cards and the methods of their
solicitation supports the argument that section 7 rights would be best
protected by requiring that election be the exclusive way to choose a
bargaining representative.
CARDS AS A REPLACEMENT FOR AN ELECTION-EMPLOYEES' RGHTS
The secret ballot election is regulated by an elaborate body of law
designed to ensure that the election will take place in "laboratory
conditions," in order to insure the employee the maximum opportu-
nity to exercise a free and reasoned choice.120 By comparison, the so-
licitation of authorization cards is virtually unregulated.' 2 '
When an employee casts a secret ballot there can be little doubt that
he is making a decision for or against having the union act as his bar-
gaining agent.122 The cards, on the other hand, frequently obscure by
ambiguous wording whether the signatures will be used to support a
direct demand for recognition or to obtain an election.'2 3 In Lenz Co.
for example, 2 4 the Trial Examiner considered cards with "I WANT
AN NLRB ELECTION NOW" in large print at the top of the card.
Underneath, small print added: "I authorize IUE-AFL-CIO to act as
my bargaining agent." The Examiner decided that these cards did not
support a valid claim to majority representation; the Board reversed. 2 5
Employer attacks based on such ambiguities have usually failed. 20
120. E.g., General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948); Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962); Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1243 (1963), Bok, supra note 95, at 65.
121. Cf. Burger, J., concurring in International Union of Elc. Workers v. NLRB.
852 F.2d 861, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 79-80
(2d Cir. 1965), which pointed out how a union attains exclusive status regardless of
whether it prevailed in an election, and that this result has the same practical effect as
certification. For a recent brief comparison of the two processes see Bok, supra note 95, at
122, espedally at n.231.
122. See, e.g., the sample ballot in Oak Mfg. Co., 141 N..ILB. 1323, 1332 (1963).
123. See, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir.
1965); NLR.B v. Peterson Bros., 342 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1965). But cf. NLR1B v. Glasgow
Co., 856 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1966).
124. 153 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9564, 59 L.R.R.,. 1636 (1905).
125. The Board chastized Trial Examiner Funke for not following Board precedent,
and noted that the cards were the same ones upheld in S.N.C. Mfg. Co., 147 NJ..R.B.
809 (1964), enforced, 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Trial Examiner Funke frequently ob-
jects that the cards do not reflect employee choice. See, e.g., Piggly Wiggly El Dorado
Co., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9624, 59 LR.R.M. 1759 (1965), note 157
infra.
126. See, e.g., WVinn-Dixie Stores, Inc, 143 N.L.R.B. 848, 850 (1963), enforced, 341 F.2d
750 (6th Cir. 1965).
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Great significance attaches to the act of signing, and according to the
majority view,
[A]n employee's thoughts (or afterthoughts) as to why he signed
a union card, and what he thought that card meant, cannot nega-
tive the overt action of having signed a card designating a union
as bargaining agent.
127
If this rule were applied consistently, the act of signing would be abso-
lutely conclusive, for even the most flagrant misrepresentation is offen-
sive only because the duped party misunderstood the intended conse-
quences of his action. But the Board has not applied the rule in all
cases; if the misrepresentation was sufficiently "gross," the signature
could be impeached.
1 28
To deal with misrepresentation about the purpose of the cards
the Board has developed the "only" or "sole purpose" doctrine. 20
Trial Examiners should reject cards only when the employee was told
that the "only purpose" or "sole purpose" of the cards was to petition
for an NLRB election. If, however, the organizer represents that "a
purpose" is to obtain an election, the cards are upheld., 0
A recent dissent by District Judge Timbers sitting with the Second
Circuit in NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co.13' reviews in detail a solici-
tation of cards upheld by the Board and a majority of the court. The
cards were signed after the union requested bargaining, fourteen
were signed by, employees who could not read, eight had dubious
or unknown dates, two were signed by employees who testified
they did not know the meaning of "representative in collective bar-
gaining." Three employees signed only because they saw others sign.
127. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See also Jas. H.
Matthews & Co. v. NLRB, 354 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1965), enforcing 149 N.L.R.B. 161 (1964);
Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128, 135 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965).
Only the Fifth Circuit has so far refused to enforce a bargaining order because cards
were ambiguously worded. NLRB v. Peterson Bros., 342 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1065);
contra, NLRB v. Glasgow Co., 356 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1966), where the same cards were
used.
128. See, e.g., Dixie Cup, 157 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,217, 61 L.R.R.M.
1329 (1966); S. E. Nichols Co., 156 NL.R.B. No. 106, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. $ 20,184, 61
L.R.R.M. 1234 (1966).
129. Originally, any representation that the cards were for an election would defeat
their validity. E.g., NLRB v. Koehler, 328 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1964); Englewood Lumber
Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 394 (1961). But the new rule came with the Board's new endorsement
of the card procedures. E.g., Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, 1269 (1963),
enforced, 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965), accord, Happach v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.
1965).
130. See, e.g., Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 862 (1964).
131. 52 CCH Lab. Cas. 16,845, 61 L.R.R.M. 2177 (2d Cir. 1966).
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One card was signed by a deaf-mute, one by the non-employed
brother of an illiterate employee, and one by an employee who died
shordy afterwards. All cards counted. Although seven other cards were
excluded by the "only" rule, the Board counted eighteen cards whose
signers were told the purpose was to get an election. Not one of the
eighteen was told that the cards would authorize the union to represent
him without an election. Even an organizer testified that she thought
the cards were only for an election. After this review of the facts, Judge
Timbers condemned the "only" rule as an attempt to distinguish de-
grees of fraud, an attempt which injects into the statute a wholly in-a-
tional basis for determining union majority status. He aptly charac-
terized the distinctions used in card evaluation as perilously similar to
the "little bit pregnant" notion.
Ambiguously worded authorization cards and misrepresentation
about the cards' purpose prevent the "reasoned choice" promoted by
the secret ballot. Moreover, organizers frequently obtain the signatures
by persuasion bordering on coercion or fraud.132 Consider the typical
organization drive: "mob psychology" induces many to sign because
"everyone else has."' 33 Employees who do not particularly want a union
are sometimes led to believe the cards are to "scare" the employer into
giving a raise.134 In one instance an employee signed from fear based
on previous union experience in another city. 3 Employees have signed
when told that sufficient signatures will persuade the union to come
and explain its offer, 36 or that if they do not sign and the union "gets
in" anyway they might lose their jobs. 37
132. In Engineers 9-- Fabricators Inc., 156 N.LR.B. No. 86. 1966 CCH N.LR.B.
20,171, 61 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1966), the cards were upheld even though the signers were
told they would have the right to vote as they chose in an election. Employees have
signed because they thought they would be invited to a union party, Permacold Indus..
Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 885, 889 n.6 (1964), or to get vacation payments due to former
members of the union, John Kinkel & Son, 157 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 61 LR.R.M. 1470, 1473
(1966).
133. See, e.g., NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 281 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1960); Engineers
& Fabricators Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,171, 61 LIRR.M. 1156,
1158 (1966). Cf. TNIT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. C 9418,
59 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1965), where "band wagon psychology" -as held to defeat two cards
in a case where the employer had not committed any unfair labor practices and there
was a problem on the eligible stevedores in the unit. See also John Kinkel & Son, 157
N.L.R.B. No. 64, 61 L.R.R.M. 1470, 1473 (1966).
134. NLRB v. Koehler, 328 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1964), enforcing as modified 139
N.L.R.B. 945 (1962).
135. Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128, 134-35 (8th Cir. 1965). cert. denied, 382
U.S. 904 (1965).
136. Kolpin Bros., 149 N.LR.B. 1378 (1964).
137. See, e.g., Heck's Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. r 20,155, 61
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The standards by which the Board evaluates union behavior are
inadequate. 12 The Board has apparently transplanted the standards
used to evaluate union activity during election campaigns to authori-
zation card drives. In elections, economic threats or promises, illegal
for employers, are held to be lawful union persuasion. The greater
leeway granted to unions is said to be justified because a union cannot
enforce its promises and threats unless it wins the election. 189 When
union election coercion can be proven, each instance normally over-
turns one vote.
The "election law" approach is clearly inapposite in the authoriza-
tion card context. In an election, many statements, particularly from
unions, are permitted on the ground that the other side can simply
rebut the misrepresentation. 40 But union representations made to se-
cure signatures cannot be rebutted so easily. Moreover, cards do not
preserve the secrecy of the employee's choice.14' If the employee thinks
the cards will lead to a secret ballot, he can insure himself against the
possibility of future retaliation and present harassment only by sign-
ing. 42 Such an employee may sign a card planning to vote against the
union or at least intending to reserve decision until he hears the em-
ployer's views or talks to fellow employees. 143 As the First Gircuit has
L.R.R.M. 1128, 1130 (1966); Hamburg Shirt Corp., 156 N.L.R.B, No. 51, 1966 CCH
N.L.R.B. 20,123, 61 L.R.R.M. 1075, 1076 (1965).
138. The Board repeatedly gives great weight to the "presumption of validity flowing
from the authorizations which appear on the face of the cards." E.g., Colson Corp., 148
N.L.R.B. 827, 840 (1964). No testimony was allowed to contradict the face of the cards.
Gary Steel Prods. Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1963). The presumption works even
when cards are in English and employees read only Spanish. NLRB v. Security Plating
Co., 856 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1966).
139. See generally Drotning, NLRB Policy Toward Employer Objections to Election
Misconduct, 16 LAB. L.J. 370 (1965).
140. See generally Bok, supra note 95, at 82-91. It also seems rather naive of the
Board to continue to disregard misrepresentations made by other employees who are
not officially union agents. The unofficial status of these employees may make their
statements non-fraudulent in the open atmosphere of an election, but it hardly supports
the presumption of reasoned authorizations attributed to the cards. E.g., Jas. H, Matthews
& Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1965).
141. For example, even in elections, when employees' anonymity was lessened by giving
a waiver of dues only if they signed up before certification, the inducement was found
illegal. E.g., Lobue Bros., 109 N.L.R.B. 1182 (1954). See Note, 33 U. Ci. L. REV. 887, 890
(1966).
142. For instance the AFL-CIO Guidebook for Union Organizers (1961), quoted in
Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 190, says: "N.L.R.B. pledge cards are at best a signifying of
intention at a given moment. Sometimes they are signed to 'get the union off my
back'...."
143. See, e.g., Engineers & Fabricators Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 1966 CCH N.LR.B.
20,171, 61 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1966); Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 188-84.
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pointed out: "a man might sign a union card as a hedge if it [thus]
costs him nothing, and yet on a secret ballot not vote for the
union .... .144
Even in the case of cards which clearly authorize the union to seek
bargaining without an election, the absence of secrecy makes threats
of wage and seniority reprisal and promises to waive initiation fees
more than mere predictions. True, the union cannot, at the time, en-
force its threats. But since his signature will be a matter of public rec-
ord, the undecided employee must carefully assess the possible conse-
quences of being counted in the minority should enough fellow
employees sign.145 And, as in elections, each instance of union coercion
and misrepresentation overturns only one vote.
In short, the coercive effect of union statements made during an
authorization card drive is entirely different from that of statements
made in a secret ballot campaign. A union organizing by means of
authorization cards is in at least as effective a position to coerce as is
an employer in a secret ballot campaign.140 And even a brief review
of secret ballot "election law" impresses one with the number of deci-
sions overturning election results on the mere suggestion that employ-
ers coerced or restrained employees in their free choice. The line be-
tween permissible "predictions" or future conditions and impermissible
"threats of reprisal or promises of economic benefit" is often resolved
in favor of the latter.
147
Not only do the cards make it more possible for the union to coerce
employees, but the card procedure is not at all suited to providing
them with the information upon which they can make a reasoned
144. NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez, & Morell, 300 F.2d 886, 888 (1st Cir. 1962). considering
a promise to waive initiation fees. On remand to the Board, 142 N.L.R.B. 475 (1963),
the Board again followed its consistent argument that waiver of the fees was the same
in the card context as in the election campaign. The court then denied enforcement a
second time, 328 F.2d 679, 681 (Ist Cir. 1964), noting that such inducements to obtain
signatures before an election were hardly inconsequential. But see Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1965), which upheld the same cards and the same
waiver by the same union.
145. See, e.g., Statement of Andrew Biemiller, Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 83, 87.
146. Secretary Wirtz, who admits that "[Tihe procedure for determining a majority
wish for union representation by means of cards is uniformly recognized as less satis-
factory than a secret vote in an election," nonetheless seems confident that the General
Counsel will seek a bargaining order only when he has no reason to believe the cards
were obtained by improper means. Secretary Wirtz adds that the employer has no duty
to seek evidence that the cards do not reflect the employees' true choice, but fails to sug-
gest how an employer's doubt can be supported. Memorandum from Secretary Wirtz to
Senator Javits, Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 19-26.
147. See generally Bok, supra note 95, at 77-82.
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
choice. 148 The union is not likely to describe accurately the probable
advantages of organizing, much less to present the disadvantages. In
contrast, the election campaign preceding a secret ballot pits adversary
candidates against each other, increasing the probability that the em-
ployee will hear both sides of the story, and that any union chosen will
be supported by a genuine majority.149
Authorization cards have become the functional equivalent of secret
ballot elections because the courts accept the compulsory bargaining
order as an appropriate remedy for the employer's refusal to bargain
upon presentation of cards. 150 But the propriety of this remedy must
be re-examined. Franks Bros., which upheld the remedy under section
10(c) because it "effectuat[ed] the policies of [the] Act," was decided
before the Taft-Hartley revisions.' 5 ' Those revisions altered the Act's
policies. The policed secret ballot campaign stands in contrast with
the virtually unregulated authorization card drive.1 2 The bargaining
order which allows the cards to replace the secret ballot constitutes a
significant modification of the statutory scheme.
THE GOOD FAITH TEST AND EMPLOYER MOTIVATION
The law of authorization cards subordinates a consideration of em-
ployee free choice to concern with policing employer conduct. Under
the Joy Silk good faith test, the bargaining order issues when an em-
ployer's refusal to recognize is not supported by a good faith doubt
of the union's majority status. The lack of good faith doubt is estab-
lished by employer conduct at the time of his refusal or is conclusively
presumed from employer misconduct subsequent to his refusal. The
difficulty of proving that the employer's doubt was in bad faith by
using as evidence his acts at the time of the bargaining request has
forced the Board to rely almost exclusively upon misconduct occurring
days and even months after the refusal. 5 3
148. See, e.g., Sandier, Another Worry for Employers, U.S. News & World Report,
Mar. 15, 1965, reprinted in Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 191-92.
149. See Bok, supra note 95, at 97-106, on problems of equal access to em-
ployees. When cards are used, there is always a chance that the union will lack faithful
support. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR PoLIcY 41:
Since a finding concerning the employees' wishes on the date of the employer's
refusal to bargain may depend upon inference or conflicting evidence, there is often
substantial risk of making an erroneous finding which would fasten an unwanted
representative upon both employees and employer.
150. See, e.g., Burger, J., concurring in International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB,
352 F.2d 361, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 86 S. Ct. 235.
151. See text accompanying notes 32-39, 115-17 supra.
152. See, e.g., Sandler, supra note 148, at 193.
153. See cases and text at notes 49-79 supra, and notice in Jem Mfg. Inc., 156 N.L.R.B.
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Finding in subsequent acts a prior lack of good faith doubt about
majority status necessitates accepting an unfounded presumption: that
an employer who takes action against a union must believe that the
union represents a majority of his employees. But acting against the
union implies absolutely nothing about the employer's belief about
its majority status. An employer might honestly doubt the union's
majority, and at the same time take action to insure that it does not
gain one. Moreover, the good faith test, by its own terms, relates to
the employer's belief regarding the union's representation of a major-
ity of his employees, not simply whether a majority of signatures ap-
pear on the cards.154 An employer could believe that a majority has
signed cards and nevertheless doubt, in good faith, that his employees
wish to be represented for the purposes of collective bargaining. Noth-
ing demands that the employer blind himself to the deficiencies in
authorization cards as a medium for registering employee choice.15
Not only is their solicitation frequently irregular but experience with
cards has revealed their statistical unreliability. In an address to the
American Bar Association, Board chairman McCullock himself pointed
out:
In 58 elections, the unions presented authorization cards from 30
to 50% of the employees; and they won 11 or 19% of them. In
87 elections, the unions presented authorization cards from 50 to
70% of the employees; and they won 42 to 529 , [sic--42 or 487]
of them. In 57 elections, the unions presented authorization cards
from over 70% of the employees, and they won 43 or 74% of
them.5 6
No. 62, 1966 CCH N.LR.B. 20,128, 61 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1966), how once the General
Counsel makes out a prima fade case based on these actions, the employer bears the
burden of going forward. In Metal Craft Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 1965 CCH N.LR.B.
9253, 58 L.R.R.M. 1628 (1965). the employer had the burden of proof on the issue of
good faith doubt.
154. The Joy Silk test, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), in fact says nothing about cards.
In Dixie Color Printing Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 1966 CCH N.LR.IB. r 20,205, 61
L.RR.M. 1285 (1966), the test was applied to an employer who received a petition, not
cards. The employer's doubt is often rather summarily dismissed. See. e.g., Peoples
Service Drug Stores, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 1965 CCH N.LR.B. C 9740, 60 L.R.R.M.
1183 (1965), in which an employer grounded his doubt of card checks on experience-
i.e., on the fact that in each of the nine previous occasions on which he had agreed to
a card check with various unions, the unions had lost the subsequent election. The
assertion that this would support his doubt was labelled "inherently unreasonable."
155. Nothing, that is, but the Board. See Jem Mfg. Co., 156 N.LR.B. No. 62, 1966
CCH N.L.R.B. 20,128, 61 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1966).
156. 1962 PRoc-.nrcs, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS Lw, A.M-ErCN BAR AssocAzboN
14-17. See also NLRB v. Johnnie's Poultry Co., 344 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1965).
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If for no other reason than this proven unreliability of cards as a
medium for registering employee choice, an employer would appear
always to have grounds for a good faith doubt of majority status.5 7
Moreover, in some circumstances recognizing the union on the basis
of these cards becomes an unfair labor practice, even if done in good
faith, if the union does not, in fact, have a majority. 58
Ignoring the complex problems raised by authorization cards, the
Board focuses almost exclusively upon the employer's subsequent mis-
conduct. The Joy Silk rationale in effect authorizes a sanction, almost
penal in nature, not otherwise available to the Board.150 Normally,
when an employer commits an unfair practice during union organiza-
tion, the Board issues a cease and desist order. If the illegal conduct
occurs in an election campaign, the Board may, in addition, order a
re-run election.6 0 But the rationale of Joy Silk makes possible a more
drastic remedy: the procedure of soliciting cards before seeking an
election may be used by the union as a device for enabling the Board
to order compulsory bargaining. If the employer complains about the
157. In Piggly Wiggly El Dorado Co., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 1965 CCH N.L.R,B.
9624, 59 L.R.R.M. 1759 (1965), Trial Examiner Funke argued that the "floodtide" of
decisions in which the Board had ignored NLRB v. Johnnies Poultry Co., supra note 156,
which gives the employer a defense if he has reasonable doubt, forced him to stick to
the Joy Silk standard. Needless to say, the Board expressly repudiated the Trial Exam-
iner's "extraneous comments."
158. Bernard-Altmann, I.L.G.W.U. (Garment Workers) v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 78-39
(1961). However, in NLRB v. Air-Master Corp., 339 F.2d 553, 556 (Sd Cir. 1964), the Third
Circuit, citing Garment Workers, supra at 739 n.11, stated that an employer could dis-
charge his responsibility by taking a card check, and in NLRB v. Whitelight Products,
298 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1962), the First Circuit held that Garment Workers did not
apply when the union presented a clear majority of cards. Still, the Supreme Court's
decision remains, declaring that good faith belief of majority status Is no defense, 866 U.S.
at 739. In NLRB v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 303 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1962), the Fifth Circuit
argued that there is no reason to worry about this situation since the Board uses as a
remedy a "necessary and desirable" election. However, precisely such an election Is at
issue in the card situation. Of course the election is crucial to those who view cards
as an opportunity for a sweetheart union. See Senator Javits' comment in Senate Hearings
on § 14(b), 188-89. This line of argument as well as the apparent conflict between circuits
might be a successful way to avoid some of the evidentiary barriers to getting the aul-
thorization card problem before the Supreme Court.
159. Of course, the recent decision in NLRB v. Delight Bakery, 353 F.2d 344 (6th Cir.
1965) calls this into doubt. The customary order to bargain comes only after the bar-
gaining relationship has been established; in Delight Bakery the order to bargain came
for § 8(a)(1) violations only-interrogation, granting of benefits-and was enforced despite
the union's lack of majority. Not only had no bargain relationship ever commenced, but
the employer did not violate the Joy Silk test since he successfully grounded his doubt
in the fact that the union requested recognition for an abnormal unit. Contra NLRB V.
Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
160. See, e.g., Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1257 (1963).
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severity of the remedy, the Board answers that the employer cannot
be permitted to "reject the collective bargaining principle."101
The Joy Silk test condemns the employer for opposing the union
and does not permit him to raise as a defense the unreliability of cards.
Yet employer opposition to unionization is not only permitted but
anticipated by the NLRA.1 2 Since unionization may well cost the
employer money and alter the way he runs his business, he certainly
has an interest in having his employees know his side of the argu-
ment.163 The simplistic Joy Silk test, in focusing solely upon employer
misconduct, does not provide a realistic standard for evaluating the
employer's motivation when faced with a sudden demand. 04
SECRET BALLOT ELECTIONS AND THE NLRA-EPLOERS' RIGHTs
The NLRA attaches several consequences to a secret ballot election
which do not attach to authorization cards. These consequences often
benefit the employer, but they may benefit the employees and union
as well. When the Board and the courts accept authorization cards they
overlook important policies of the Act.
For example, the employer's right to express his views, guaranteed
to some extent by section 8(c) of the Act and by the First Amendment,
is curtailed by the authorization card procedure.10 If the card-soliciting
union moves quickly and quietly, the employer will not discover the
drive until too late. 66 In this situation the employer, at best, will not
161. See Ben Duthler, Inc., 157 N.LR.1B. No. 3, 1966 CCH N.LR.B. 20,216, 61
L.R.R.M. 1305 (1966) where the Trial Examiner dismissed the idea that the remedy was
severe. See also Jem Mfg. Co., 156 N.L.KB. No. 62, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,128, 61
L.R.M. 1074 (1966), and NLRB v. Austin Powder Co., 350 F.2d 973, 977 (6th Cir. 1965).
162. See note 73 supra for the provisions of § 8(a)(2), intended to prevent union-
management collusion and note 165 infra, for those of § 8(c), granting the employer
protection to express his views-presumably against the union.
163. According to Cox, the elimination of the rule making interrogation of employees
by employers illegal per se amounts to a recognition of the employer's "legally cognizable
interest in preventing the unionization of his plant." Cox, LLw IAN TuE NAT1o.AL LAZoa
POLICY 40.
164. Cf. the discussion of the difficulties presented by sudden demands in NLRB v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 346 F.2d 936, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1955).
165. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964):
Sec. 8....
(c) The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or
be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if
such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
166. See, e.g., NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc., 354 F.2d 926 (Ist Cir. 1965), in which
there was a 2 day "quickee" campaign; Garner Automotive & Machine, Inc., 156 N.LR.B
No. 63, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,125, 61 L.R.R.M. 1107 (1966), in which the employer
was apparently surprised by the cards, and reacted with anger.
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have the opportunity to exercise his free speech rights until after the
card presentation. And unless he has a good faith doubt about the
union's majority status, he will never have the opportunity to express
his views. He cannot force an election merely by saying that he wishes
to have the opportunity to exercise his 8(c) or constitutional rights.
Since the Joy Silk test makes the right to an election turn solely on
doubt about majority status, when the employer is surprised by the
union's presentation of cards, he has no free speech rights at all.
107
If the employer does have a doubt about the union's status, he will
be given the opportunity to campaign. But he must take particular
care not to do or say anything before the election which the Board
might later find improper. 60 For having been presented with cards,
he faces the threat of compulsory bargaining.0 0
The imminent bargaining order cannot fail to discourage an em-
ployer from campaigning vigorously. He will be deterred not only
from engaging in potentially coercive activity, but also from perfectly
permissible activity.170 The standards of unfair campaign tactics are
not so unequivocal that he can predict confidently what activity is
allowed and what is not. 1 ' Indeed the rationale of Joy Silk would seem
to reach employer misconduct falling short of unfair labor practices. 172
Unless the employer actually favors the union-and this the Act
frowns uponl7 3-virtually anything the employer says or does in his
campaign will be intended to dissipate the union's strength. Why else
would he bother to campaign? Under Joy Silk such statements could
help to demonstrate that the initial refusal to bargain was not based
167. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 181; 111 CoNe. Rae. 14584 (daily cd. June
29, 1965). In Cosmodyne Mfg. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 1964 CCH N.L.R.B. 13,642, 58
L.R.R.M. 1063 (1964), the employer was condemned for wanting an opportunity to bring
home to the employees his anti-union view. The employer in this case insisted that he
had no prior intimation of unionization before the demand and received a repudiation
petition 6 days later.
168. See, e.g., Wirtz, supra note 88, at 24. See also the lengths to which the Board
goes to find coercion, e.g., the interpretation of the letters in Marion Bottling Co., 156
N.L.R.B. No. 100, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. $ 20,166, 61 L.R.R.M. 1190 (1966); and in Lord
Baltimore Press, 142 N.L.R.B. 328 (1963).
169. The employer acts at his peril. See, e.g., NLRB v. Elliott-Williams Co., 345 F.2d
460, 464 (7th Cir. 1965).
170. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 95, at 112, where he argues that a restrictive policy
on interrogation is permissible since only a re-run election is in the offing and the
employer is not being judged to have violated the law.
171. See generally Bok, supra note 95, at 111, particularly his discussion of the confu-
sion over what constitutes interrogation.
172. See, e.g., Note, 33 U. Cmi. L. Ray. 387, 403-04 (1966). This could easily result by
combining the approach of Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), with Bernet Foam.
173. See § 8(a)(2), supra note 73.
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on a good faith doubt of majority status.1 74 Thus even when the em-
ployer succeeds in insisting upon a secret ballot the exercise of his right
to free speech is significantly dampened by the threat of a bargaining
order.
If, on the other hand, the employer discovers the drive before the
bargaining demand, he may have an opportunity to present his em-
ployees with arguments against unionization. But again this chance
hardly replaces the opportunity he would have had in an election cam-
paign. The authorization card drive is generally a fast-moving and
concealed union effort. 175 When the employer learns of the drive, he
may not know which union is involved, and, more important, he usu-
ally will not know the details of the union's promises and claims.170
How can such an employer engage in any intelligent adversary dia-
loge? Absent cooperative informants and spies,177 the employer must
gain his information through interrogation and surveillance.'- 8 But
interrogation and surveillance are dangerous forms of self-help and
easily lead to unfair labor practice charges. 70
174. If the union proceeds with the election and loses, all it must do is defeat the
validity of the election, e.g., Kolpin Bros., 149 N.L.R.B. 1378 (1964), where the union
failed to impeach the election result before charging an 8(a)(5) violation. This does not
require an unfair labor practice by the employer; see Bok, supra note 95, at 42; the
anti-union pressure and improper conduct may come from local business men. e.g.. Ham-
burg Shirt Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. Cj 20,123, 61 LR.R.M. 1075
(1965). It must be said, to the Board's credit, that they have always found an actual
violation of the Act in turning over an election loss and ordering bargaining on the
cards. But the line between illegal campaigning and an unfair labor practice is quite
obscure; and the strong possibility exists that some "violations" are found with the bar-
gaining order as a goal. So much was suggested by the court in Indiana Ra)on Corp. v.
NLRB, 555 F.2d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 1966), when they spoke of the "self-supporting scaf-
folding of unfair labor practice findings."
175. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 183.
176. See, e.g., Samsonite Corp., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 5, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. o, 20,212
(1966), where apparently the name of the union was unknom.
177. See, e.g., DeKalb Telephone Co-op., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B.
i 20,195 (1966); even with informants, the information may reveal little. In Bernel Foam
Prods., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), the employer actually attended the union meeting; but
this rarely happens. In Hamburg Shirt Corp., 156 N.LR.B No. 51, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B.
20,123, 61 L.R.R.M. 1075 (1965), the employer was criticized for relying on information
provided by only 3 of 123 employees, suggesting that he ought to try to get as much
information as possible at least to protect himself.
178. Consider even in elections the employer's incentive to interrogate, e.g., Bok,
supra note 95, at 106. In Pueblo Supermarkets, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 1966 CCH
N.L.R.B. 20,139 (1966), the employer tried to conduct a secret poll to discover union
strength while preserving employee anonymity-the poll was found illegal.
179. See, e.g., supra notes 67, 69 and Kay Allen Classics, Inc., 152 N.LR.B. No. 134,
1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9401, 59 L.R.R.M. 1308 (1965); Associated Beer Depots, 152 N.LR.B.
No. 44, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9314, 59 L.R.R.M. 1102 (1965); S. S. Logan Packing Co..
152 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 1965 CCH N.LR.B. 9313, 59 L.R.R.M. 1115 (1965).
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Even if the employer educates himself without committing an unfair
practice, he will find it more difficult to campaign effectively and law-
fully against cards than in an election. An election, for example, takes
place at a fixed future time, and for twenty-four hours before the elec-
tion, the Board prohibits both sides from communicating with captive
audiences. 80 This rule prevents last minute claims on either side from
going unchallenged if inaccurate or fraudulent. When cards replace
the secret ballot, an employee may sign at any time; and when a ma-
jority sign, the contest may be over."" Thus the employer frequently
loses the opportunity to refute the final persuasive union argument.
If that argument involves inaccurate or fraudulent assertions about the
employer's business or the union's past record, any employer rebuttal
comes too late to be effective.
Under these circumstances the contest between union and manage-
ment rapidly deteriorates. The employer's campaign is directed not at
the group of employees, but at each individual, card by card. 82 Em-
ployer speech directed at a single employee easily loses the protection
of 8(c) by constituting a threat of reprisal or promise of benefit.
183
The cards place the employer in a campaign dilemma: 8 4 his campaign
is likely to be either ineffective or unlawful' 85 And by encouraging
180. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
181. The majority at the time of the illegal refusal determines the issue. The subse-
quent loss of support for the union, even if produced by legitimate persuasion, Is disre-
garded once illegal conduct occurs, all attention returning to the time of the card presen-
tation. See, e.g., NLRB v. Kellogg's, Inc., 347 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Philamon
Labs., Inc., 298 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1962).
182. The problems of individual as opposed to group confrontation are often quite
complicated and many factors such as situs of confrontation play a part. See, e.g., Peoples
Drug Stores, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 634, 637 (1957), especially member Rodgers dissenting.
183. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 194, where the environment of a card solici.
tation was characterized as a "gold fish bowl" rather than a "laboratory atmosphere."
184. In Ben Duthler Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,216, 61 L.R.R.M.
1305 (1966), the Trial Examiner Funke described the card-supported bargaining demand
as placing the employer in "triple jeopardy": if he recognizes the union and it does
not, in fact, have a majority, he violates § 8(a)(2); if he undertakes his own investigation
to support his doubts, "he must exercise scrupulous care" or he will violate § 8(a)(1),
if he refuses to recognize and the union does represent a majority, he violates § 8(a)(5).
185. In NLRB v. Dan River Mills, 274 F.2d 381, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1960), Judge Brown
accurately described the entire problem:
Assuming that despite its unilateral choice of the alternative of a Board proceed-
ing, the Union would have still agreed to this method and an impartial person had
been chosen, even this might have proved to be insufficient. For it was the Employer's
contention-then and since-that a great number of these cards did not represent
the voluntary wishes of such employees.
How was this critical fact to be determined? True, an employer does have tile
legal right to interrogate to find out. [Citation omitted.) But like Odysseus, he stands
almost helpless as he makes the perilous passage between Scylla and Charybdis. If he
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self-help, the cards defeat the Act's goal of preserving industrial
peace. 8 6
Authorization cards interfere with industrial peace in other ways as
well. The twelve month election bar of section 9(c)(3) does not operate
unless there has been an election. 8 7 Similarly, recognitional picketing
by a rival union is prohibited by section 8(b)(7) only if the existing
bargaining agent won a secret ballot election.1 8 Until a contract is
signed, the employer is not-as he is after losing a secret ballot-secure
from harassment by other unions. And a rival union is free not only
to harass by petitioning for an election but also to picket to support
its demand for recognition.
In these situations the secret ballot is the procedure selected to ac-
makes a simple inquiry of each employee and accepts the simple answer, the very
pressures apprehended may well bring about the employee's confirmation as well.
If he probes deeper, the inquiry unavoidably becomes an investigation and soon it
is inescapable that there be insinuations or intimations in terms of relative evalua-
tion of union or nonunion conditions. At that point, undefined and undefinable,
the inquisitor trespasses either on forbidden ground or flounders in the Serbonian
bog, [citation omitted], surrounding it so that what started out to be a means of
compliance with law is turned into an affirmative charge of an unfair labor practice.
And all the while, all that is done, all that is said, all that is asked, all that is
answered, rests in the uncertain recollection of the partisan participants. What
begins as the employer's quest now ends in the employer's flight. And now no longer
will his conduct be judged alone by what was said. Now, through the unavoidable
nature of our legal administrative machinery, [citation omitted], it will be judged by
what interested partisans say one said was said, or what others said to have said say
was said.
As we have pointed out, [citation omitted], self-help under these circumstances is
tortuous and fraught with danger. Substituting partisan determination of controversies
through the means of volcanic pressures of an industrial conflict for that of impartial
disinterested governmental machinery ought not to be encouraged.
186. See, e.g., NLR.B v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 346 F.2d 936, 940 (5th Cir.
1965).
187. See, e.g., National Waste Material Corp., 93 N.L.R.B. 477 (1951). The card check
does not create a bar. When the union loses an election, the bar operates. Hotpoint, Inc.,
N.LR.B. Cas. No. 31-RC-38, Nov. 16, 1948, CCH Ln. L. RrP. 2720.244. And an em-
ployer can refuse to bargain on cards for one year after an election loss, e.g., Dow
Chemical Co., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9390 (1965); unless the loss
was in a rival union election which no union won, e.g., Conren, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 43,
1966 CCH N.L.B. S 20,131, 61 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1966).
188. 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1964). The limitation of sub-section A
would be satisfied, curtailing rival picketing, if a contract has been signed-the "contract
bar" preventing a question of representation from being raised under § 9(c). E.g., McLeod
v. Local 202, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 239 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). And if the
"card" union had lost the election, picketing would be barred for a )'ear. E.g., Lumber
Workers, Local 2797, 156 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,103, 61 L.R.R.M. 1046
(1965). Both the employer and employee have an interest in freedom from organization
after the union loses an election. See Comment, Picketing by An Uncertified Union: the
New Section 8(b)(7), 69 YA. LJ. 1393, 1404 (1960).
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commodate the Act's complicated and frequently conflicting policies.1 8D
And the benefits to the employer are paralleled by benefits to the
employee. Surely the employee, too, has an interest in promoting in-
dustrial peace and hearing the employer's arguments against the union.
The singleminded concern over employer conduct which marks the




Different parties, as we have seen, may claim to have been injured
in different ways by the authorization card detour around an election.
The Employee. (1) The employee's signature may have been coerced
or procured by fraud. (2) He may not have understood the conse-
quences of signing, believing, for example, he had signed to get an
election. (3) He may have signed willingly and knowingly, but desire
to change his mind because subsequently he obtained more informa-
tion about unionization or the particular union. (4) Finally, he may,
after having signed, simply feel uncertain and desire to hear the em-
ployer's arguments.
The Employer. (1) The employer may genuinely disbelieve the
cards represent the majority wishes of his employees. His disbelief may
be based upon proven or suspected instances of forgery, fraud, or coer-
cion, or upon a studied distrust of card solicitation. (2) The employer
may believe that some employees would change their minds if he could
present his full argument. (3) The employer may want to take advan-
tage of the benefits which accrue after an election.
The Union. The union benefits by an election; for example, it may
obtain protection against a rival union, or the right to engage in secon-
dary boycotts.190
Third Parties. Rival unions or the Board itself may feel that the
189. The policies are frequently simplified as promoting industrial peace, protecting
employee rights, and advancing collective bargaining. See § I of the N.L.R.A., 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964); Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term,
75 YALE L.J. 59, 86-87 (1965). The election serves several functions under the act to
harmonize the conflict: the expedited election to insure recognitional picketing Is
legitimate-§ 8(b)(7)(c), note 188 supra; the election permitting certification in order to
insure a union secondary boycott is proper-§ 8(b)(4)(c), 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4) (1964); the decertification election open to unionized employces--§ 9(c)(l)(A)(1),
note 4 supra; the de-authorization election allowing employees to terminate a union or
"closed" shop-§ 9(c)(1), 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
190. For the advantages of elections see, e.g., Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators, Inc.,
154 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9663, 60 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1965). See also Note,
39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 866 (1964); and General Box Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 678 (1949).
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cards permitted a collusive or "sweetheart" arrangement between em-
ployer and union.191
Recently Proposed Solutions
In the first session of the present Congress, two Senators proposed
legislation relating to the authorization card procedure.19 2 The bills
were proposed during the Senate consideration of the repeal of section
14(b) of the NLRA, the provision allowing states to forbid closed or
"union" shops. 193 Under a union shop agreement, permitted by section
8(a)(3), an employee is forced to pay union initiation fees and dues
as a condition of employment.19 4 Senators Javits and Fannin were con-
cerned that repealing 14(b) without regulating the authorization card
procedure would make it possible to force all employees to support a
union which did not actually represent a majority.'0 5
The proposed revisons attempt to clarify the relation among sections
9(a), 9(c), 8(a)(5) and 10(c). Senator Fannin would modify 9(a) and
10(c). 196 A union would became a 9(a) representative only by winning
191. Although the collusive or "sweetheart" situation may be over-emphasized by
some critics of the cards, it does exist. See, e.g., the "sweetheart" union situations in
Continental Distilling Sales v. NLRB, 348 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Richard W.
Kaase Co., 346 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Fotochrome, Inc., 343 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1965); NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 281 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1960); Kilpatrick's Bakeries,
Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. 9788, 60 LR.R.M. 1313 (1965); Star-Litc
Electronics Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 1965 CCH N.L.R.B. C 9738, 60 LR.R.M. 1212
(1965). See also Senate Hearings on § 14(b) 189, for another type of collusion-the so.called
"racket union."
192. Senator Javits introduced S.2133 on June 14, 1965, 111 Co.xc. REc. 12969. 12994
(daily ed. June 14, 1965) but revised it substantially in his second bill S.2395, introduced
on Aug. 11, 1965, 111 CONG. REc. 19308 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1965). Senator Fannin introduced
S.2226 on June 29, 1965, 111 CONr. REc. 14584 (daily ed. June 29, 1965).
193. S.256, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), to repeal § 14(b), 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(b) (1964).
194. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
195. Although Senator Javits was particularly concerned about lack of a majority in
collusive and "racket" union situations, Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 189. emplo)ers in a
non-collusive situation occasionally have been ordered to bargain even when a union has
lost its initial "card majority." See cases cited at note 181 supra; and see also Henry Spen
8: Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 1964 CCH N.L.R.B. 13,672, 58 L.R.R.M. 1048, 1031 n.3
(1964).
196. S.2226, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965):
That section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, is amended by
inserting before the first proviso therein the following: "Provided further. That such
bargaining representatives shall have been certified by the Board as the result of an
election conducted in accordance with section 9(c), unless the employer shall haic
engaged in a course of conduct in violation of section 8 with intent to undermine a
majority secured without coercion or misrepresentation by the labor organization or
organizations seeking recognition in accordance with section 9(c)."
SE. 2. Section 10(c) of such Act is amended by inserting before the period at the
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a secret ballot election, unless prior to the election the employer com-
mits an unfair labor practice with intent to undermine the union's
majority. This union majority, furthermore, must have been secured
"without coercion or misrepresentation." A parallel revision of 10(c)
would limit the issuance of a compulsory bargaining order to the situ-
ation described in the new 9(a).
Senator Fannin's proposal to render ineffective cards obtained
through coercion or misrepresentation does not seem to change the
law at all, since even under present case law such cards do not count.
The defect in the present law is in the standards, transplanted from
election law, which permit all but the most extreme and offensive
union tactics. The bill fails to modify these standards.
But perhaps Senator Fannin intended his bill to place clearly on
the Board the burden of proving that the union obtained the card ma-
jority without the coercion or misrepresentation. If the bill were con-
strued in this way, the Board would probably have great difficulty in
affirmatively proving the cards were legitimately procured without first
instituting procedures to guarantee effective review of the solicita-
tion.197 This solution, though possible in theory, would be extremely
difficult in practice. The difficulty of regulating elections suggests that
regulating card solicitations would be even more difficult. If Senator
Fannin's bill is intended to increase the probability of an election, it
seems to fail. By permitting any employer unfair labor practice to
eliminate the necessity of a 9(c) secret ballot, the bill allows the Board
to continue to find an 8(a)(5) violation on the basis of the Joy Silk
rationale. In short, Senator Fannin's proposal does nothing except
make Joy Silk statutory and possibly shift to the Board the burden of
overcoming a presumption that the cards do not reflect free choice.
And even this change is not explicit but depends upon interpretation
by the Board and courts.
end of the third sentence thereof a colon and the following: "Provided further, That
the Board shall not issue an order to bargain in any case in which the bargaining
representative shall not have been certified as a result of an election conducted In
accordance with section 9(c), unless the employer shall have engaged in a course of
conduct in violation of section 8 with intent to undermine a majority secured with-
out coercion or misrepresentation by the labor organization or organizations seeking
recognition in accordance with section 9(c)."
197. For instance the Board would probably have to allow full discovery as under the
Federal Rules, allow testimony from all employees, signers or not, as to typical represen-
tations made to get the cards, prohibit any testimony as to a signature except from the
signer himself, consider whether employees had changed their minds subsequent to sign-
ing but before the employer committed any unfair labor practices, etc. The administrative
burden in time and money would appear tremendous.
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Senator Javits felt that the best way to secure employee rights was
to strengthen the employer's right to an election.19 8 He would amend
9(c) and 8(a)(5). Under his new 9(c)(6), an employer presented with
cards would have a right to a secret ballot, regardless of an alleged
8(a)(5) refusal to bargain, unless, prior to the election, he commits
other unfair labor practices which dissipate the union's majority or
eliminate the possibility of a fair election. In addition, section 8 would
be modified by the addition of a new subsection (g) making the em-
ployer's refusal to recognize on the basis of cards an 8(a)(5) violation.
However, the new provision explicitly grants two defenses to a charge
of refusal to recognize: (1) that the employer had a good faith doubt
about the union's majority status; and (2) that he had petitioned for
a secret ballot under the new subsection 9(c)(6). An employer pre-
sented with cards would have an absolute right to an expedited elec-
tion.19 9 And if the employer sought such an election, the Board could
198. S.2395, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965):
That section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act is amended by adding the
following new paragraph:
"(6) In any case in which it is alleged in a petition filed by an employer pursuant
to paragraph (1)(B), that a labor organization seeking recognition as the representa-
tive of the employees of such employer has presented evidence purporting to show
that a majority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit desires to be repre-
sented by such labor organization, it shall be the duty of the Board, if it determines
that in all other respects a question of representation affecting commerce exists, to
forthwith, without regard to the provisions of paragraph (1), direct the holding of
such an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and to certify
the results thereof. The consideration of the petition and the holding of the election,
in any such case, shall not be delayed by reason of the pendency of an unfair labor
practice charge based upon the refusal of the employer to bargain collectively with
the labor organization, and no such unfair labor practice charge based upon a refusal
to bargain prior to the election shall thereafter be considered unless the Board deter-
mines that the labor organization had once been authorized to represent a majority
of the employees in the bargaining unit, but that as a result of unfair labor practices
committed by the employer (other than unfair labor practices under section 8(a)(5)),
(a) such labor organization is no longer authorized to represent such majority or (b)
the conditions required for the holding of a fair election no longer exist."
Sac. 2. Section 8 of such Act is amended by adding the following new subsection:
"(g) it shall be an unfair labor practice under subsection (a)(5) of this section for
any employer to refuse to recognize a labor organization as the representative of his
employees if such employer-
"(I) has been presented with evidence purporting to show that a majority of em-
ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit desires to be represented by such labor
organization;
"(2) has no bona fide doubt that such majority desires to be so represented; and
"(3) has failed within a reasonable time to file a petition pursuant to paragraph
(1)(B) of section 9(c), containing the allegations referred to in paragraph (6) of such
section."
199. Senator Javits intended the same expedited election now used under § 8(b)(7).
111 CoNG. REc. 19308 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1965).
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not compel bargaining unless the employer committed some unfair
labor practice other than an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain after his petition
for an election. Javits' bill would modify Joy Silk by limiting the
subsequent employer misconduct which can trigger a bargaining order,
thus eliminating the potential use of Joy Silk to compel bargaining
when lack of good faith doubt of majority status was proved by mis-
conduct falling short of unfair practices. 2
00
Under this reading of the bill, once the employer did commit an
unfair labor practice, the full Joy Silk rationale would apply. Another
possible interpretation would eliminate Joy Silk completely. If the new
section 8(g) were deemed to describe the exclusive way a refusal to rec-
ognize could constitute an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain, then the 8(a)(5)
route to compulsory bargaining would be unavailable in all card cases
once the employer had promptly moved for an election. Filing a peti-
tion is a defense to 8(g). This extreme construction of the bill probably
would not come from the Board or courts, however, especially since
Senator Javits apparently intended to have the present use of 8(a)(5)
survive as partially modified.
2 01
The Javits bill does more than the Fannin bill to increase the prob-
ability of elections. The employer would have the right to insist on
an election simply because he wanted to present his views on unioni-
zation. The threat of a bargaining order rather than the re-run election
might still deter permissible speech. But since misconduct not amount-
ing to an unfair labor practice could never lead to a bargaining order,
the objection to cards as preventing free speech loses some of its force.
However, as long as the cards retain any potential for allowing com-
pulsory bargaining instead of a re-run election, some First Amend-
ment problems persist.202 The potential detriment to free speech seems
particularly strong in light of the present Board's proclivity to find
coercion in arguably innocuous campaign statements.
203
The Fannin proposal suggests that the Act should be amended to
200. See text accompanying notes 172-174 supra.
201. 111 CONG. REc. 19308 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1965).
202. The argument can be made that it is perfectly permissible to deter employer
speech by a mere re-run election, since the employer has not been found to have vio-
lated the Act, and is not being punished. But the bargaining order is far stronger medi-
cine, not mere administration of the Act's mandate to conduct, according to rules, an
election. To the employer vehemently opposed to a union, the remedy will appear a
criminal sanction. One might also consider in this context that an employer could be
vehemently opposed to a particular union-yet not unalterably against unionization Itself.
203. See, e.g., Laars Engineers, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 1341 (1963), modified, 332 F.2d 664
(9th Cir. 1964); Remington Rand Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1963); and general discussion
of these and other cases in Bok, supra note 95, at 78-82.
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make it unlikely that the cards will interfere with employee free choice.
This approach might discourage ambiguously worded cards and abuses
in the solicitation procedure. But this approach, in order to be effec-
tive, would probably involve difficult and time-consuming administra-
tive policing procedures.20 4 More important, the standards for deter-
mining fraud and coercion must be modified to reflect the difference
between secret ballots and cards: the employee's signature is public.
Only the preservation of employee anonymity would eliminate the pos-
sibility of union coercion. But card solicition would then become vir-
tually identical to a secret ballot, the only difference being that em-
ployees could make their designation at any time.
Neither the Fannin bill nor the Javits bill guarantees that the em-
ployees will have heard and considered any employer arguments before
making an irrevocable designation. The better of the bills in this re-
spect, Senator Javits', would still, in some situations, hold the employee
to a signature generally made before the employer has expressed his
views.
Suggested Solutions
The Javits bill, by granting the employer an initial absolute right to
an election and limiting to unfair labor practices the conduct which
can lead to a bargaining order, corrects some of the defects of the Joy
Silk test. But a bargaining order, saddling the employees with an un-
elected union, is a drastic remedy, unresponsive to many of the Act's
policies. For this reason, the Board should assess the employer's unfair
labor practice with regard to its probable coercive effect upon em-
ployee free choice. The bargaining order should not issue automati-
cally, but only when a re-run is clearly not likely to reflect employee
choice.
05
More important, the Javits bill should be supplemented to minimize
the probability that signatures will be obtained by subtle misrepresen-
tation or coercion. The Board should be required to judge union so-
licitation conduct according to more realistic standards. And some pro-
vision should be made for policing card drives. For example, unions
might be required to register all card drives with the appropriate
204. See note 197 supra.
205. Leaving the matter thus to the Board's discretion, the decision to fall back on the
cards, in lieu of an election or re-run, would easily be made as often as it is today. The
suggestion that reliance on the cards should occur only in a few situations is parallel to
the rationale in NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1965), where the
court rejected the bargaining order because the unfair labor practices were not sufficiently
aggravated.
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NLRB Regional Director, who would then approve the form and word-
ing of the cards. If the union failed to register, the cards could still be
used to petition for an election, but not to warrant a bargaining order.
Supervising the solicitation would be much more difficult. A per-
fectly unambiguous card, if obtained by misrepresentation or coercion,
should not count as a valid designation. As a slight safeguard against
illegitimate solicitation, any employee should be permitted to revoke
his signature at any time before voluntary recognition, an election, or
the filing of unfair labor practice charges. A further safeguard might
be introduced by requiring 60% or 65% of the employee signatures
rather than a bare majority. But probably in order to check union mis-
conduct realistically, the employer must be allowed to question his em-
ployees regarding the card solicitation. If the employer were later
charged with unfair labor practices, he can then raise as a defense to
a bargaining order the illegitimate union solicitation. Further, if the
employer succeeds in proving three or four instances of misrepresen-
tation or coercion, a pattern or practice of illegitimate solicitation
should be deemed established and all cards invalidated. The difficulties
of supervising the solicitation are apparent. Employer interrogation
which is clearly coercive should not be tolerated, but if the solicitation
is to be adequately policed, the employer must be permitted some lee-
way in the questions he asks. Drawing the line between permissible
and impermissible interrogation may well be impossible.
Even if the solicitation could be policed in order to insure that em-
ployee signatures were not obtained illegitimately, compelling bargain-
ing on the basis of cards deprives the employees of the opportunity to
hear the employer's arguments. The employee's choice is free only in
the most superficial sense. A choice of apples over oranges can hardly
be described as free if the chooser does not know what an orange is.
Only by permitting the employer to persuade his employees not to sign
or to withdraw their signatures can the employees be provided with
sufficient information.2 06 But to permit this would be equivalent to
holding the election campaign earlier, under conditions that would
make it infinitely more difficult to police, while focusing the campaign
upon individual employees who are deprived of voting anonymity.
One sensible modification of the Act would provide at least a partial
check on illegitimate union solicitation and at the same time enable
the employees, in a manner of speaking, to hear both sides of the argu-
ment. Employees organized by cards should be able to "decertify" their
206. Such persuasion presently violates the Act. E.g., Heck's, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 73,
1966 CCH N.L.R.B. 20,155, 61 L.R.R.M. 1128 (1966).
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union relatively easily. In this way, employees who were defrauded or
cajoled into signing, or who changed their minds after hearing the em-
ployer or watching the union perform, would be granted partial pro-
tection.2 07 When cards serve as the basis of recognition, it might be wise
to permit ten, or even five per cent, rather than the present thirty per
cent to petition for decertification. Such a change would also serve to
prevent "sweetheart" arrangements.
Finally, the employer compelled to recognize and bargain with a
union should be granted the same protection against subsequent harass-
ment by rival unions as is granted to employers who have lost an elec-
tion. Naturally, the Board must simultaneously take precautions against
inadvertently protecting "sweetheart" arrangements; but except for this
situation, there is no reason to deny an employer the benefits of the
Act.
These extensive revisions, if workable, would retain the bargaining
order threat to deter overzealous employer conduct and provide pro-
cedures for assuring that the cards were uncoerced. Unfortunately,
some of the proposals, the most important ones, would probably prove
unworkable. It is difficult to imagine a procedure for policing union
card solicitation drives which is administratively feasible, immune from
employer abuse, and also effective. Perhaps more important, there
seems to be no way short of a pre-election election campaign to provide
the employees with sufficient information to make a reasoned and truly
free choice. And when the employee cannot vote anonymously, he is
necessarily subject to additional pressures, if only from fellow em-
ployees. The blatant inadequacies of authorization cards may be rem-
edied. The inherent inadequacies will persist.
Perhaps the best way of solving all the problems raised by authori-
zation cards would be to abolish them as a means for designating a
bargaining representative. Abolition could be accomplished by con-
struing 9(c) as an exclusive provision for selecting a 9(a) representa-
tive.208 The chief objection to this proposal, that it would leave the
NLRB impotent to deal with pre-election employer misconduct, de-
pends in large measure upon the accuracy of the unproven assumption
that employer misconduct so taints the election that a re-run is an in-
adequate remedy.20 9
207. See Senate Hearings on § 14(b), 188, on the present difficulty of employees' obtain-
ing a decertification election.
208. This would of course repair the "sweetheart" or collusive union problems by re-
quiring a union to win an election before being in a position to obtain a "dosed shop."
209. And one should remember that for the 10 years before Bernel Foam the re-runs
were not so clearly inadequate.
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But even if the re-run were proved inadequate, the propriety of the
compulsory bargaining remedy would still be open to question. Just
as no one could contend that a re-run is wholly inadequate (the em-
ployer frequently loses if that is the measure of adequacy), no one could
contend that a bargaining order is wholly appropriate. And on balance,
the cards do more harm than good. Abolishing them might force the
Congress, the courts, or the Board to devise more appropriate if less
summary means of preventing employer coercion.210 Secret ballot elec-
tions are not perfect. But they are the best procedure yet devised for
enabling the citizen and the working man to register his choice.
210. Before an election, for example, a representative of the NLRB might briefly ad-
dress the assembled employees, explain their rights, and dispel their fears. Fines perhaps
would serve as a supplemental remedy for other than 8(a)(1) violations. Hitting the em-
ployer's pocketbook could also take another form: the posting of a bond before each
election, forfeited if there are any violations, and increased substantially with very re-run.
Some additional ease in obtaining injunctions might give the Board needed power. For
an excellent discussion of potential remedies see Bok, supra note 95, at 124-132, although
Professor Bok's recommendations concerning a bargaining order must be rejected when
supported only by authorization cards. As pointed out, only Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 702 (1944), supports the legality of this remedy-a remedy developed when the stat-
ute was unabashedly pro-union.
